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Implementation is at the core of lawmaking in our divided government. A rich
literature covers the waterfront with respect to agencies’ implementation of legislative mandates, and another equally robust line of scholarship considers Congress’s
implementation of treaties. Missing from those discussions, however, is another area
of implementation central to U.S. foreign relations: the implementation of transnational regulatory agreements.
This Article examines how federal agencies have harnessed far-reaching discretion from Congress on whether and how to implement thousands of international
agreements. Agencies regularly implement agreements by relying on a self-developed
menu of options, much like they do in the domestic regulatory context—only without
the checks and balances that those processes provide. This analysis of the operation
of agreements presents a set of extemporized means through which the executive
maintains control of these agreements and their regulation of the rights of private
actors without legislative intervention or administrative law constraints. These revelations stand in contrast with conventional understandings of implementation as
well as to prior accounts of how “international law [is] part of our law.”
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INTRODUCTION
There is a strange omission in the longstanding debates over
the mechanics of legal implementation. Courts, as well as scholars from multiple fields of law, have engaged in discussions for
many decades about how statutes are implemented by agencies.1
A different collection of courts and scholars has considered how
treaties are implemented by Congress.2 But almost no work has
examined these questions as applied to our thousands of executive
agreements: agreements with foreign governments concluded by
the executive branch pursuant to a congressional delegation
of authority.3 We have neither an account of agreement implementation—the processes through which agencies establish
1
See generally, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Christensen
v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944);
Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J. 1003 (2015); Kristen E.
Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465 (2013); Cass R. Sunstein,
Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989).
2
See generally, e.g., Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008); Carlos Manuel Vázquez,
Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599 (2008); Ernest A. Young, Treaties as “Part of Our Law,” 88
TEX. L. REV. 91 (2009); Curtis A. Bradley, Self-Execution and Treaty Duality, 2008 SUP.
CT. REV. 131 (2008); Oona A. Hathaway, Sabria McElroy & Sara Aronchick Solow, International Law at Home: Enforcing Treaties in U.S. Courts, 37 YALE J. INT’L L. 51 (2012);
David H. Moore, Do U.S. Courts Discriminate Against Treaties?: Equivalence, Duality, and
Non-Self-Execution, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2228 (2010); David L. Sloss, Executing Foster v.
Neilson: The Two-Step Approach to Analyzing Self-Executing Treaties, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J.
135 (2012).
3
I use the shorthand term “executive agreement” to refer to these ex ante congressional-executive agreements as other scholars have done. These agreements stand in
contrast to agreements that are approved by Congress after their negotiation (ex post
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cross-border programs and develop new domestic rules that are
derived from foreign relations—nor a sense of how those choices
alter the roles of the branches in domestic and international lawmaking.
This Article begins that work, first, by identifying the phenomenon of agreement implementation. It is here that the black
box of implementation may be its most obscure. Although
Congress frequently delegates authority to agencies to negotiate
international agreements, those delegations are almost always silent as to implementation. Drawing from a review of agency records and a collection of communications with government
officials, this Article elucidates how agencies are inventing ways
to give effect to the more than three thousand international
agreements into which they have entered.4
The story of how our foreign relations bureaucracy implements agreements has practical, policy, and legal dimensions. It
involves the practical operationalization of transnational commitments across the administrative state. In carrying out that work,
agencies make policy choices that often result in the regulation of
private action in accordance with those agreements. At the core
of that exercise is a determination about the domestic legal force
of obligations agreed upon with foreign governments. That determination is made and applied by agencies often without the opportunity for review. In sum, uncertainties as to whether an international agreement is binding on private actors and
enforceable by agencies as a matter of U.S. law are regularly addressed by those agencies in quiet, unstudied, and—as this
Article shows—inconsistent ways.
congressional-executive agreements) and to executive agreements made pursuant to inherent presidential authority. For a thorough review of the types of international agreements into which the United States enters, see generally Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’
End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117
YALE L.J. 1236 (2008) [hereinafter Treaties’ End]. The lines become fuzzier when we get
away from government-to-government written agreements and toward international
standards agreed to in international organizations or like circumstances. I am focused
here on the former, not on situations like those faced in National Resources Defense Council v. Environmental Protection Agency, 464 F.3d 1, 7–10 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (considering the
legal status of a rule promulgated by the EPA in furtherance of a term that governments
agreed upon in connection with the Montreal Protocol, a treaty), or those involving implementation of standards that were agreed upon directly pursuant to delegation such as in
19 U.S.C. § 2578 (referring to international standard setting by the executive branch and
requiring notice and comment in the making of the standards).
4
Professor Oona A. Hathaway catalogued more than 2,700 in 2008. See Treaties’
End, supra note 3, at 1260. In previous work, I identified around one thousand additional
agreements related to trade alone. Kathleen Claussen, Trade’s Mini-Deals, 62 VA. J. INT’L
L. 315, 324–37 (2022).
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Thinking about implementation beyond statutes and treaties
is long past due. Executive agreements are the primary instrument of U.S. lawmaking in international relations.5 These agreements govern and guide our transnational regulatory encounters.6 Consider a tomato coming into the United States from
Mexico. Agreements concluded between the United States and
Mexico cover countless aspects of the tomato’s preparation and
transport.7 These types of agreements address not just your sandwich fixings, but nearly all products, natural resources, and services entering and exiting the United States.8
In recent years, scholars have analyzed the constitutional
foundations of these agreements, asking whether the executive
has the right to agree to an international commitment and verifying the integrity of the procedural steps taken to conclude the
agreement.9 While that ex ante review is important for our conceptions of the separation of powers, we have many fewer answers
about the ex post transposition of these executive agreements into
U.S. law. The agreement life cycle has multiple parts: Congress
delegates, the agency negotiates, and then the agency brings the
agreement home. This Article is focused on the homecoming.
Take the following sample scenarios:
• Congress delegates authority to the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA) to enter into agreements with other
governments concerning common or equivalent standards
for organic products. USDA officials negotiate an agreement with Taiwan concerning the approval of Taiwan’s organic labelling certification as equivalent to U.S. domestic
5
The growth in the application and scope of executive agreements has been well
studied in empirical terms. Nearly all the agreements entered into by the United States
in recent years fall into this category. See Treaties’ End, supra note 3, at 1286–88.
6
Cf. Jacob Katz Cogan, The Regulatory Turn in International Law, 52 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 321, 349–52 (2011).
7
See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Exchange of Data on Exports of Fresh Tomatoes Between the Secretariat of Economy of the United Mexican States
and the Department of Commerce of the United States of America, Mex.-U.S., Aug. 19–
23, 2013, https://perma.cc/FK48-CUDN.
8
See, e.g., Agreement Concerning Trade in Women’s and Girls’ Wool Trousers, Arg.U.S., May 14–31, 1991, Hein’s No. KAV 2937; Agreement on Reduction of Export Duties
on Ferrous and Non-Ferrous Scrap Products, Ukr.-U.S., Feb. 22, 2006, T.I.A.S. 06-222;
Understanding Concerning the Procurement Procedures for Telecommunications Equipment in Korea, S. Kor.-U.S., Mar. 29–Apr. 10, 1995, Hein’s No. KAV 5190.
9
See generally, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
The Failed Transparency Regime for Executive Agreements: An Empirical and Normative
Analysis, 134 HARV. L. REV. 629 (2020); Daniel Bodansky & Peter Spiro, Executive Agreements+, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 885 (2016); Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power
over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140 (2009) [hereinafter Presidential Power].
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standards.10 The USDA posts a copy of the agreement on
its website and issues an internal memorandum regarding
the operation of its content.11 U.S. agricultural specialists
working at the border then begin to confirm the validity of
the Taiwanese organic label on products imported by U.S.
companies that are then sold throughout the United
States.
• Congress authorizes the Treasury Department to regulate
the intellectual property protection of product names.12 The
United States subsequently enters into an agreement with
the European Union concerning the protection of the name
“Brandy de Jerez,” which is to be reserved for brandy from
Spain.13 The Treasury Department then prepares a formal
ruling regarding this commitment.14
• Congress directs the Secretary of State to enter into “negotiations . . . as may be necessary and appropriate” to
achieve specified fisheries goals.15 The State Department
negotiates an agreement with Canada that says that the
United States will “ensure that sufficient coho salmon enter [a certain river] to meet the agreed spawning objective”
(among other commitments).16 Thereafter, the National
Marine Fisheries Service, which is part of the Department
of Commerce, carries out a notice-and-comment rulemaking to address the overfished coho salmon stock along the
U.S.-Canada border.17
In each instance, an agency decided how it would subsequently treat, as a matter of law and as a matter of mechanics,

10 See Letter from Stanley Kao, Rep., Taipei Econ. & Cultural Rep. Off., to Ingrid
Larson, Managing Dir., Am. Inst. in Taiwan (undated), https://perma.cc/H8CD-KM8K
[hereinafter Taiwan Organics Agreement].
11 See International Trade Policies: Taiwan, USDA, https://perma.cc/Q8EU-264A.
12 27 U.S.C. § 205.
13 Recognition of Certain Distilled Spirits/Spirit Drinks, European Union-U.S.,
Mar. 25, 1994, Temp. State Dep’t No. 94-129.
14 ATF Ruling 94-5, TTB, https://perma.cc/UG8T-XKJG.
15 16 U.S.C. §§ 1822(e)(2), 1822(h).
16 Agreement Between the United States of America and Canada Relating to and
Amending Annexes I and IV of the Treaty of January 28, 1985, as Amended Annex IV
ch 1, Can.-U.S., June 30, 1999, T.I.A.S. 99-630 [hereinafter Salmon Agreement]. Agreements tend to use similar language to this, such as “agrees to restrict” or “shall permit.”
17 See, e.g., Fisheries Off West Coast States and in the Western Pacific; West Coast
Salmon Fisheries; 2004 Management Measures, 69 Fed. Reg. 25,026 (May 5, 2004) (issuing a final rule to address the overfished coho salmon stock, referring to the U.S.-Canada
border).
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the commitments to which it agreed. As these three distinct examples demonstrate, this final step of implementation can take a
variety of legal and administrative forms.
None of these scenarios would appear to pose any great risk
to democracy nor any major concern about executive overreach.
And yet, none of these followed a traditional administrative law
procedure from start to finish. In fact, none of them followed any
clearly prescribed procedure at all. Rather, agencies are developing means of implementing agreements extemporaneously—and
wholly apart from any preexisting domestic regulatory power
they may or may not have on the agreement topic. Thus, one aim
of this Article is to chronicle how foreign relations come home
through these ad hoc approaches.
Improvised implementation appears to be a common feature
across the executive branch. Agencies regularly deploy improvised “implementation mechanisms”18—means of giving the commitments they have negotiated the force of U.S. law (or not). This
Article provides an overview of two principal types of improvised
implementation mechanisms: those in which the agency relies on
additional procedural steps for enforceability and those in which
the agency acts without undertaking any additional formal initiatives. It examines the qualities of each as well as their positive
and normative payoffs.
Perhaps unexpectedly, improvised implementation has certain virtues. These ad hoc mechanisms deployed by the executive
hold promise for their enhancement of administrative efficiency
and for achieving foreign-policy aims. I argue that agencies’
heightened discretion sometimes creates unanticipated space for
innovation, public participation, and flexibility, and that those assets are worth preserving even at the danger of compromising certain other rule of law values.
Improvised implementation’s most unsettling feature is the
confusion it creates as to the legal status of executive agreements.
In a conflict between a preexisting rule and a new agreement, it
is unclear which preempts the other. We lack a well-defined understanding as to the conditions under which an agreement or a

18 Professor Edward Rubin has used the expression “implementation mechanisms”
to refer to agencies themselves. See Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 373 (1989). I redeploy it here to refer to the approaches of agencies to negotiated agreements. Further, the word “improvised” here is
intended to mean that the mechanisms are devised without any specific, consistent procedure and are often crafted as needed when agreements are signed.
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rule made pursuant to an agreement carries the force of law, including preemption authority.19 How are courts to manage the domestic and international fault lines?20 Resolving these issues is
not just a retrospective sorting exercise. Rather, it helps us deconstruct pervasive transnational cross-border activity occurring
throughout our regulatory ecosystem both now and in the future.
The Article considers the implications of three possible approaches, centered around familiar doctrinal norms, for answering these challenging questions and for thinking about agency
choices in improvised implementation. One model underscores
statutory implementation principles vested in ordinary rulemaking and adjudication as part of agencies’ domestic regulatory
work. A second emphasizes foreign relations rules about treaties
but applies them loosely to executive agreements, seeking to integrate concepts of treaty law into agency practice. Both of these
models create problems for practice and for doctrine when applied
to executive agreements, however: the former by overclaiming
and the latter by eliding some of the distinctive features of the
cross-border environment. Path dependence and various blind
spots in our conceptualization of implementation have obscured
the question of how the law should manage executive agreements.
A third alternative accepts neither statute nor treaty rules, regarding agency implementation absent express congressional delegation as ultra vires. Each of the three approaches lends itself to
a different set of legal outcomes. And, since none of the three benefits from commanding support, the consequence is a degree of
dissonance in just what work the implementation mechanisms
are doing.
Fortunately, we need not choose between the rewards of executive autonomy and the risks of uncertain legal status and
unpredictability under these frameworks. Improvised implementation of executive agreements suffers from these problems pri-

19 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 cmt. c (AM. L.
INST. 1987) (warning that “Congressional authorization to make an executive agreement
that would supersede federal law is not to be inferred lightly” and acknowledging that
“[t]he effect in domestic law of an executive agreement made by the President under his
own constitutional authority (§ 303(4)) in respect of an earlier treaty or federal statute has
not been established”).
20 Professor John Coyle, addressing this issue, has noted that when a rule of international law is written into a domestic statute, for example, courts may fail to recognize
that the rule in question has international origins. See John F. Coyle, The Case for Writing
International Law into the U.S. Code, 56 B.C. L. REV. 433, 481–82 (2015). The same may
be true for future lawmakers.
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marily because of its extemporized approach, not because our international agreements ought not be implemented by the executive branch or ought not be implemented at all. The executive’s
implementation of agreements is not just necessary; it is the principal way that our international commitments become part of
U.S. law and legal practice.
The Article suggests instead that lawmakers provide greater
guidance to the executive branch for agreement implementation.
By writing implementation guidance for agencies into its negotiating delegations, Congress may better delineate agency responsibilities in a way that enhances intra- and inter-branch cooperation in the mediation of our domestic and international legal
regimes. I map out a future that accommodates these special features and incorporates elements from the treaty and statute landscapes.
Regardless of whether our institutional actors are willing to
undertake this retail-level reform, understanding the executive’s
improvised implementation mechanisms provides useful lessons
for the lenses through which scholars and courts think about both
agreements and agency behavior. First, treaty-centered myopia
in foreign relations has meant that the prevailing theories about
implementation of international agreements are based on just a
small and differently situated share of those agreements.21 The
agreement-implementation experience demonstrates that foreign
relations scholarship may be overly entrenched in its binary approach to international agreements of dividing the universe into
“self-executing” and “non-self-executing” treaties.22 The field’s
near-exclusive concentration on the treatment of treaties in the
federal courts is part of the problem. The executive’s improvised
implementation mechanisms challenge the field’s resistance to alternatives beyond judicial pronouncements on “self-execution.”
Second, administrative law’s concentration on statutes
causes it to miss other inputs and dialogues occurring in less visible practices. Its principal emphasis on how agencies make law
leaves ample space for a consideration of the ways through which
agencies use executive agreements as swords and shields in these
subconstitutional domains. Because administrative agencies are

21 See Hathaway et al., supra note 9, at 632. That is only an estimate given how many
cross-border agreements remain unknown. See, e.g., Claussen, supra note 4, at 7 (describing issues with agreement recordkeeping for trade-related agreements).
22 See Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 578–80 (2007) (describing theories of self-execution pre-Medellín); see also supra note 2 (collecting sources).
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doing the heavy lifting, agreement implementation also has consequences for the broader literature about choices among agency
lawmaking tools. These agencies’ experiences cast doubt on assumptions about the limits of agency action in the face of legislative delegation. They also reveal a further layer of the agency lawmaking exercise: implementation by one agency of commitments
made by a sibling agency.
The two fields’ adherence to formulaic paradigms has prevented greater cross-pollination between them.23 In fact, the opposite has occurred. Both administrative law and foreign
relations law leave the conceptualization of the agreement-implementation process to the other. Regulatory law scholarship tends
to treat as exceptional foreign instruments and foreign-facing
lawmaking, leaving those matters to foreign relations law,24 and
the foreign relations law literature tends to focus on the implementation of treaties alone, leaving the domestic to regulatory
scholars.25 The lack of crossover between the two disciplines has
led to a disjunction of explanations as to what agencies are doing
while even a cursory examination of the implementation of executive agreements confirms that these bodies of law are
fully coincidental in that important space. These agreementimplementation practices raise issues both of appropriate agency

23 A slender literature has started to push back on the foreign relations side. Recent
work has discussed how courts could apply the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. §§ 551, 553–559, 701–706, to agency actions that might be considered foreign relations; how the APA could be applied to the way treaties and other agreements are made;
and how treaty implementation could be more like statutory implementation. See, e.g.,
Ganesh Sitaraman, Foreign Hard Look Review, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 489, 493 (2015) (“As a
matter of separation of powers goals and statutory design, foreign and domestic affairs are
far more similar than is often assumed.”); David Zaring, Sovereignty Mismatch and the
New Administrative Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 59, 84 (2013) (arguing that there is no role
for the process requirements of the APA where agencies negotiate rules with foreign counterparts); Jean Galbraith, Make Treaty Implementation More Like Statutory Implementation, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1349–63 (2017) (proposing that agencies implement treaties).
24 The absence of executive-agreement implementation in statutory implementation
discussions is curious given that those discussions are transsubstantive, just as administrative law is general rather than specific. See, e.g., David Marcus, Trans-Substantivity
and the Processes of American Law, 2013 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1191, 1201 (2013) (discussing
administrative law as transsubstantive). But there is a noticeable jurisprudential exception for foreign-facing administrative practices and perhaps an even more significant perceived exception as discussed further below. Regulatory scholarship is concerned with how
the metaphorical sausage gets made, but it is reasonably unconcerned with those same
processes if the sausage comes from abroad. Cross-border sausages, or rather cross-border
sources of law, that form the bases for agency action do not feature readily in administrative law despite the field typically not discriminating.
25 See supra note 2 (collecting sources).
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supervision and of enforceability of our foreign commitments—
issues that remain at the heart of both disciplines.
To be sure, the gap between the two fields is not just academic
or theoretical. It is also a doctrinal disparity, created in part by
the limitations on judicial review that are baked into both areas.26
Agencies are deploying traditional regulatory tools in implementing agreements and conducting foreign relations, but we lack jurisprudential principles to guide that work. All of this suggests
that the moment is ripe to study how executive agreements are
implemented.
The Article’s argument unfolds in four parts. Part I introduces the executive branch’s mechanisms for implementing
agreements as seen in the work of our foreign relations bureaucracy. It substantiates my claim that implementation of executive
agreements occurs through a set of ad hoc practices that have
been heretofore overlooked. I rely on information from agency records as well as from officials engaged in implementation and decision-making surrounding implementation to elaborate these
activities.27 Two categories of implementation mechanisms
emerge: what I call “procedural implementation” and “automatic
implementation.” The first refers to circumstances in which agencies take additional lawmaking steps to convert the agreement
commitments into domestic law or operation whereas the second
refers to instances in which the agency acts on the commitment
without undertaking any further administrative steps.
Part II evaluates the executive’s improvised deployment of
these implementation mechanisms. I identify both the salutary

26 The longstanding political-question doctrine may be one such obstacle to challenging agreements, although the Court may have altered prior understandings of the doctrine’s contours with its decision in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1 (2015). For important
discussions pre-Zivotofsky, see Bradford Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive Agreements,
93 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1594 (2007) (discussing how courts may find constitutional challenges
to executive agreements to involve “nonjusticiable political questions”) and Jide Nzelibe,
The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV. 941, 975–99 (2004) (arguing for a broad
application of the political question doctrine in foreign affairs). For more recent scholarship, see generally Harlan Grant Cohen, A Politics-Reinforcing Political Question Doctrine, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1 (2016).
27 The information developed here is drawn from communications (email exchanges
as well as semistructured and unstructured interviews) with current and former officials
from the USDA, Department of Commerce, Department of Homeland Security,
Department of Justice, Department of State, Treasury Department, and the USTR. I
asked these officials about processes within their agencies for implementation, the personnel involved, interagency communications, and their evaluation of strengths and weaknesses of the agency’s management of agreement implementation. Many requested anonymity to speak frankly; I have honored that request.
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aspects and potential problems. The present arrangement promotes some traditional tenets that we associate with managerial
liberalism and good governance like efficacy and efficiency.
Where it falls short, however, is with respect to competing values
like accountability, transparency, and reliability. Most concerning about the executive’s experimental implementation is the uncertainty it creates for the enforceability of the rules that agencies
are negotiating.
Part III considers the implications of applying any of three
potential doctrinal frames that have guided the traditional thinking on implementation. Each frame leads to distinct conclusions
regarding the force of law that should be afforded to agency activities surrounding agreements as well as the agreements themselves. And each frame provides agencies with variable degrees of
empowerment, redistributing the burdens of implementation
across the branches. I maintain that these competing paradigms
pay too limited attention to the special qualities of agreement implementation.
Part IV seeks to reconcile some of the functional benefits of
improvised implementation with some of its drawbacks. I advocate for greater congressional guidance on the front end—what I
call “prescriptive implementation”—a fix that would capitalize on
the potential for executive implementation to preserve and maximize rule of law values while avoiding some of the bureaucratic
incoherence and legal unpredictability that results from present
practices. Congress could set out the contours of a path forward
for agencies’ operationalization of the agreements. This approach
provides an institutional solution for constitutional formalists
and a pragmatic compromise for the competing domestic and international frames. Part IV also looks beyond doctrine to consider
the lessons and ramifications of the executive’s improvised implementation of agreements.
A brief word on terminology is important here: The Article
uses the term “implementation” to refer to the integration or
transposition into U.S. law, and the corresponding operationalization by agencies, of executive-agreement commitments.28 It
28 To be sure, the U.S. government’s implementation of any one of its international
commitments is not a singular moment or action. Rather, it may require several moves
over a long period of time. Nevertheless, I would distinguish implementation from the
later administration, modifications, monitoring, enforcement, and ongoing diplomatic engagements that agreements may precipitate. In a separate work, I examine the longer life
of agreements beyond the immediate and more formalistic questions posed in this Article.
See Kathleen Claussen, The Domestic Life of International Agreements (2022) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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chooses this term for consistency with the statute and treaty discussions that occupy the administrative law and foreign relations
law fields—even if the term has very different genealogies in
those fields.29 I use this term here to demonstrate both similarities and differences among these literatures, even if imperfect.
“Incorporation” is often employed in a like way;30 the demarcation
as to what constitutes incorporation and what constitutes implementation merits additional investigation. Still, I leave any further excavation of these nuances for another day and limit
myself to “implementation” for purposes of unearthing this
phenomenon.31
I. THE EXECUTIVE’S IMPROVISED IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISMS
The scenario is common: Congress delegates authority to an
agency to negotiate an international agreement.32 The delegation
provides the agency with the power to make a deal with another
government about a certain subject. Consider the examples above
concerning standards for organic products, intellectual-property
protection of spirits, and protection of coho salmon. In each instance, the United States entered into an agreement that is binding on the United States as a matter of international law. What
happens next is implementation.33 Unless the United States already has a system in place to guarantee the outcome to which it
has committed, it now ought to take steps to meet this obligation.
29 Implementation is one of regulatory and treaty law’s leading preoccupations, and
a rich literature covers this waterfront. The use of “implementation” to refer to statutory
execution by agencies finds its primary scholarly and political origins in the 1970s. See
generally EUGENE BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A BILL
BECOMES A LAW (1977); ERWIN C. HARGROVE, THE MISSING LINK: THE STUDY OF THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF SOCIAL POLICY (1975); JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN & AARON WILDAVSKY,
IMPLEMENTATION (2d ed. 1979).
30 See, e.g., DAVID L. SLOSS, THE DEATH OF TREATY SUPREMACY: AN INVISIBLE
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 295–318 (2016) (describing a range of ways in which treaty selfexecution has been conceptualized). See also generally John Coyle, Incorporative Statutes
and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 655 (2010) [hereinafter Incorporative
Statutes].
31 For more on the confusion, see S.I. Strong, Beyond the Self-Execution Analysis, 53
VA. J. INT’L L. 499, 540 (2013) (discussing incorporation and implementation when considering the New York Convention); John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal
Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 310, 314–15 (contrasting implementation
with an “act of transformation,” “adoption,” or “reception”).
32 See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801, 1822; 22 U.S.C. § 2656; 33 U.S.C. § 988(a); 43 U.S.C.
§ 31(b); 50 U.S.C. § 2402; 18 U.S.C. § 2523. Most of these are permissive delegations; some
are directive.
33 I note that sometimes executive agreements, such as the fish-related example discussed here, are themselves implementations of programs anticipated by prior treaties.
The 1999 Exchange of Notes followed upon the 1985 U.S.-Canada Pacific Salmon Treaty,
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The precise steps taken by the agency after negotiating the
agreement are dictated not by the agreement nor by the original
statute.34 There are often several options that the executive
branch could pursue to implement the agreement. As seen above,
the agency may choose to pursue legislative actions such as congressional approval and legislative change, notice-and-comment
rulemaking, or other actions with force-of-law effect for private
actors. Alternatively, the agency may deploy a procedural action—an action without force of law.35 For example, in the case of
the salmon agreement, rather than execute a notice-andcomment rulemaking, the State Department or other agencies
might have chosen to develop interagency working groups for
monitoring salmon stocks.36 The Department could also choose to
take an action that has both interpretive and legislative elements
such as prompting changes in Coast Guard practices that might
help address the salmon problem.37
Sometimes agencies enter agreements that are based not on
specifically delegated authority to negotiate but rather on statutes outlining the agency’s general mission. Consider a statute
that states that the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) shall
“have primary responsibility for developing . . . [U.S.] international trade policy.”38 The USTR enters into an agreement with
Japan that creates a rule about what types of pencils may enter
the United States at a reduced border-tax rate.39 In this instance,

as noted to me by Professor Sean Murphy. One can observe multiple layers of implementation in situations such as this: treaties that provide for the possibility of additional
agreements (non-treaties) with the foreign partner. Then those agreements must be implemented by the agency.
34 In some instances, these delegations to negotiate may cover topic areas already
within the regulatory authority of the agency for domestic administration; in others, they
may cover new territory. I return to the relevance of coincidental domestic authority in
Part II.
35 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of
Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467, 476–81 (2002) (explaining the differences between procedural actions and actions with force of law).
36 For example, the recently created U.S. Interagency Working Group on Illegal,
Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing might undertake that work. That group was created
pursuant to statute, see the Maritime SAFE Act, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 3551 (2020), though
that would not prohibit the State Department from creating a salmon-specific group.
37 The Coast Guard maintains interagency cooperation as part of its mission to secure U.S. borders, for example. See U.S. Coast Guard, Partnerships and Stakeholders,
https://perma.cc/47RF-D6QG.
38 19 U.S.C. § 2171(c)(1)(A).
39 U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement, Oct. 7, 2019, Annex II, https://perma.cc/9L23
-4WMH (setting out rules of origin and tariff rates on products from Japan, including pencils). At the time of this negotiation, USTR told members of Congress that this deal was
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while the statute did not provide for negotiating authority, the
agency used an agreement to achieve an objective under its enabling act.40 There, the agreement was a tool in the agency toolkit
negotiated under general authority.
In practical terms, Congress regularly gives the executive
broad statutory directives to enter into executive agreements. But
it neither (1) prescribes how to translate those agreements into
U.S. law nor (2) reviews any such agreement after its conclusion.41
Congress has largely ceded its ex post role in the international
sphere. Rather, it asks the executive branch for receipts.
Congress has required the executive branch to report to it about
and provide it with a copy of those agreements.42 Only in some
areas of law, such as in treaties and in the conclusion of some
major trade deals, is Congress engaged in the approval, adoption,
and implementation after an agreement is negotiated.43 Most often, the executive branch decides for itself how or whether to incorporate the agreement into U.S. law through its own mechanisms. And it turns out that each agency develops its own ad hoc
approach for agreements it signs.
Simply put, every time Congress expressly or implicitly delegates authority to the executive authority to negotiate an agreement, and the agency negotiates the agreement, that agency often
may undertake nearly any strategy it chooses to implement the

negotiated pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 4202(a), which permits the negotiation of trade agreements and proclamation of reduction in duties but does not authorize the president to
design rules of origin.
40 This scenario sets up a situation that could call into question the elasticity of organic and enabling acts and the range of instruments available to agencies to carry out
those missions, but I leave that for another day.
41 Sitaraman, supra note 23, at 557 (commenting that “[d]elegations of negotiation
power are broad, usually have no time limits, and limit ongoing congressional oversight
because the Executive can negotiate and commit the nation to agreements without disclosing its activities to Congress or the public”).
42 See Hathaway et al., supra note 9, at 656–57.
43 See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act, Pub. L.
No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057 (1993) (codified in scattered sections of 19 U.S.C.). For some
treaties and trade agreements, Congress often passes legislation concurrent with or after
the entry into force to operationalize, elaborate, or execute the commitments of the agreement. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 31–75 (2d
ed. 2015). The most familiar mechanism for treaty implementation is what is popularly
known as “implementing legislation.” See generally Incorporative Statutes, supra note 30.
Occasionally, Congress may also delegate in that legislation to the executive branch to
take regulatory action in the operationalization of the treaty or agreement. See generally,
e.g., CONG. RSCH. SERV., S. PRT. 106-71, Treaties and Other International Agreements: The
Role of the United States Senate (2001), https://perma.cc/8EU7-2ESQ [hereinafter Senate
Report 2001] (also noting that implementation legislation occurs also when funds are
needed, which could be yearly).
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agreement and incorporate it into U.S. law. Alternatively, the
agency may take no further action at all. Agencies select the
“how”: the mechanics of the articulated and unarticulated parts
of the bargain manifest in the text. Sometimes they do so with an
opportunity for participation in determining the details and
sometimes they do not.
This Part investigates and presents the implementation
mechanisms that the executive branch uses when given a blank
check from Congress. In some cases, agency choice depends on the
nature and content of the agreement. Sometimes it turns on
agency custom. Sometimes it turns on who else is at or behind the
table: strong interest groups or other advocates.44 On other occasions, it depends on the individual lawyer in the bureaucratic
decision-making chain.
Getting at this information requires overcoming various obstacles surrounding the limited visibility into the inner workings
of agencies negotiating these agreements and a lack of transparency in the existence of these agreements.45 Some of these agreements as well as the measures taken thereafter are known only
to government officials. For these reasons, I reached out to bureaucrats across a wide range of agencies to ask about their practices.
I identify two primary groups of mechanisms by which the
executive branch implements these agreements—one in which it
undertakes additional lawmaking and the other in which it treats
the agreement as binding on the agency and private parties. The
first puts an administrative process into motion. The second considers the agreement to be part of U.S. law without any further
action. Although I lump many different specific agency moves into
these two groups, that is not to suggest these are not diverse when
disaggregated into specific instances of implementation. Differentiating the two groups is the number of steps required to give the

44 Having a separate implementation moment drives home the power of two-level
games in international lawmaking captured in the political science literature. See Robert
D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L
ORG. 427, 434 (1988):

The politics of many international negotiations can usefully be conceived as a
two-level game. At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by
pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek
power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level,
national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic
pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments.
45 See Hathaway et al., supra note 9, at 633 (describing transparency difficulties and
limited visibility surrounding executive agreements).
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commitment the force of law: at least one in the case of procedural
implementation and none in the case of automatic implementation. What follows is the undernoticed story of how international
agreements get pushed through the paper grinder of the administrative state.
A. Procedural Implementation
A first set of implementation mechanisms used by agencies
comprises those that depend on additional agency lawmaking.
Some agencies make new law, such as through ordinary domestic
rulemaking to assure that an agreement commitment is made
part of U.S. law. I call this “procedural implementation.” The
term refers to situations when the executive branch applies a
further regulatory procedure as a means of bringing
executive-agreement commitments into domestic law, either because the agreement says to do so or because the agency so
chooses.46 That additional procedure may be internal to a single
agency or may involve another entity with overlapping jurisdiction. This was the implementation mechanism used by the State
Department with respect to the salmon agreement noted above.47
The agreement negotiated by the State Department precipitated
a Commerce Department rulemaking exercise to bring the commitments into force for U.S. private actors.
Procedural implementation was likewise the approach undertaken by the Treasury Department in its protection of “Brandy
de Jerez.”48 The United States protects the names of distilled spirits from distinctive geographic locations by refusing entry to foreign liquors that use the same name but do not come from a preapproved country. For instance, a product cannot come in from
anywhere other than France and be labeled as “Cognac.”49 The
Department of the Treasury maintains regulations surrounding

46 I intend to refer here to procedure that leads to the development of legislative rules
as well as nonlegislative rules with de facto binding effect. For additional explanation on
these distinctions and the importance of each, see Nicholas Parrillo, Federal Agency Guidance and the Power to Bind: An Empirical Study of Agencies and Industries, 36 YALE J.
ON REG. 165 (2019); Ronald M. Levin, The Binding Effect of Interpretive Rules, YALE J. ON
REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (May 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/W3EH-VEV2.
47 See generally, e.g., Fisheries Off West Coast States and in the Western Pacific;
West Coast Salmon Fisheries; 2004 Management Measures, 69 Fed. Reg. 25,026 (May 5,
2004).
48 See supra text accompanying note 13.
49 Standards of Identity for Pisco and Cognac, 78 Fed. Reg. 28,739, 28,742 (May 16,
2013).
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these foreign spirits. In 1994, the USTR entered into an agreement with what is now the European Union regarding the name
“Brandy de Jerez” which originates in Spain.50 In the agreement,
the United States committed to recognize “Brandy de Jerez” as
limited to products made a specific way and originating in Spain.
Several months later, the Treasury issued an administrative ruling expressing its recognition of “Brandy de Jerez” as a product
from Spain.51 The agency and private parties rely on the ruling
for enforcement purposes rather than the agreement.
Procedural implementation need not involve public participation, though it often does. In some instances, agencies have issued
rules that implement the agreement without opportunity for
notice-and-comment, for example. This is the mechanism used by
the Department of Transportation as a way of announcing and
enacting into U.S. law the toll adjustments on the St. Lawrence
Seaway.52 Those toll rates are agreed yearly with Canada using
an executive agreement and then implemented into U.S. law by
final rule without any opportunity for comment.53
Most agencies that rely on procedural implementation choose
from among traditional agency means to bring those commitments into law such as through regulatory promulgation and
notice-and-comment rulemaking. The international commitment
becomes an input in that process. The commitment is not necessarily transposed directly into U.S. law; rather, the agency can
select which commitments to transpose, when it wishes to do so,
and how to carry out that transformation.
A related type of arrangement is one in which the executive
branch agrees with a foreign partner to begin a regulatory process. The agreement does not make any commitments on behalf
of the United States apart from stating that it will initiate a regulatory process or “take final action” on rulemakings that would
meet an objective of a foreign partner.54 An example of this type
50

Recognition of Certain Distilled Spirits/Spirit Drinks, supra note 13.
The agency published a notice in the Federal Register regarding the ruling. Agreement Between the United States (US) and the European Union (EU): Geographical Designations, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,623 (July 13, 1994),
52 See, e.g., Tariff of Tolls, 86 Fed. Reg. 15,585 (Mar. 24, 2021). The rule notes that,
because it involves foreign affairs, it is not subject to the Department’s ordinary rulemaking procedures. Id. at 15,585–86.
53 See, e.g., Exchange of Notes Constituting an Agreement Between the Government
of Canada and the Government of the United States of America Amending the Agreement
Concerning the Application of Tolls for the St-Lawrence Seaway, U.S.-Can. (Mar. 30,
1989), https://perma.cc/EWJ6-QRUE.
54 Exchange of Letters, U.S.-Bol. (Jan. 6, 2020) (on file with author); Side Letter on
Distilled Spirits, U.S.-Mex. (Nov. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/2JGE-A69N.
51
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of procedural implementation now in progress is an October 2019
agreement between the United States and Japan concerning the
elimination or liberalization of “standards of fill” for wine.55 In
that instance, the agreement commitment is to continue ongoing
efforts to reach a final rule regarding the shape and size of wine
bottles. In December 2020, the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and
Trade Bureau issued a final rule on the subject although it did
not therein approve the new size and shape as anticipated by the
2019 agreement; rather, it indicated that it would undertake another rulemaking on those proposed sizes and shapes.56 No further rulemaking had occurred as of the time of writing.
Another example of the latter type is the U.S.-Canada Potato
Agreement of 2007, which provides that “the United States of
America intends to initiate, as soon as practicable, rule-making
to modify its import requirements to provide for the importation
of: [ ] potatoes of any color . . . .”57 In March 2008, the Agricultural
Marketing Service within the USDA issued a final rule modifying
potato standards.58 These promises to begin a process have grown
in popularity in recent years.59
Both types of procedural implementation have the same effect. They use domestic rulemaking in cooperation with an international agreement to effectuate regulatory change and incorporate an international commitment into U.S. law. They also
involve some form of agency deliberation as to form and substance, often requiring more than one agency to effectuate the negotiated commitments. They sometimes include an opportunity
for public input. As can be seen, procedural implementation can

55

Exchange of Letters, U.S.-Japan (Oct. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/DUW3-FNBA.
Addition of New Standards of Fill for Wine and Distilled Spirits; Amendment of
Distilled Spirits and Malt Beverage Net Contents Labeling Regulations, 85 Fed.
Reg. 85,514 (Dec. 29, 2020). The final rule cites 27 U.S.C. § 205(e) as its basis for authority,
which authorizes the Secretary to prescribe regulations relating to the “packaging, marking, branding, and labeling and size and fill” of alcohol beverage containers.
57 Technical Arrangement Between the United States and Canada Concerning Trade
in Potatoes art. V, U.S.-Can., KAV 8287, https://perma.cc/272Q-DCZT.
58 Potatoes; Grade Standards, 73 Fed. Reg. 15,052 (Mar. 21, 2008). As an aside, I
note that the final rule curiously cites 7 U.S.C. § 1621–1627 as its source of authority,
which, at best, gives the Secretary the authority to take steps to pursue new markets for
U.S. agricultural goods. See 7 U.S.C. § 1622. The agreement was never transmitted by the
State Department to the Congress, so we do not have any indication of what authority the
branch relied upon to make the agreement.
59 Government officials could not confirm that this was a conscious choice on their
part, but they agreed that they shared this perception. It is most easily visible in the distilled-spirits context. See Kathleen Claussen, Regulating Foreign Commerce Through Multiple Pathways: A Case Study, 130 YALE L.J. F. 266, 271–72 (2020) [hereinafter Multiple
Pathways].
56
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take some time, unlike automatic implementation as discussed in
the next Section.
B. Automatic Implementation
Some agencies have treated executive agreements as part of
U.S. law without doing more. I call this “automatic implementation.”60 With automatic implementation, agencies see the executive agreement as creating binding commitments and act directly
upon those commitments. They grant the terms of the agreement
the force of law sua sponte, on par with regulations, without any
further lawmaking steps. Further, with automatic implementation, agencies interpret executive agreements as having direct effect on individuals, substituting them for domestic rules—and
they do so even if another agency negotiated the agreement. This
concept of automatic implementation is similar to what Professor
John Jackson described as “direct application.”61 Under Jackson’s
definition, direct application is “the notion that the international
[ ] instrument has a ‘direct’ statutelike [sic] role in the domestic
legal system.”62 In instances of automatic implementation, like
Jackson’s use of direct application, the government relies upon
the agreement as part of its domestic law, and private actors may
likewise be able to do so.63
The organics equivalency agreement with Taiwan noted
above, for example, has been automatically implemented. In that
exchange of letters, which mirrors other exchanges related to organics with other foreign partners, the USDA agreed that products handled in accordance with Taiwan’s organic regime “may be
sold, labeled, or represented in the United States as organically
produced, including by display of the USDA organic seal.”64 That
commitment was not subject to additional lawmaking. Organic

60 Professor David Sloss has used the term “automatic incorporation” to refer to a
type of self-execution in the treaty context. See David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24
YALE J. INT’L L. 129, 146 (1999). I find it useful here to draw from Sloss’s term with some
modifications.
61 Jackson, supra note 31, at 310.
62 Id. at 310 n.1.
63 Unlike Jackson, however, I do not take a position here on the justiciability of
agreements that are automatically implemented. His term does more work here than “automatic implementation.” I note only how government agencies have treated them: acting
upon them as having the force of law.
64 Letter from Ingrid D. Larson, Managing Dir., American Institute in Taiwan, to
Stanley Kao, Rep., Taipei Economic and Cultural Rep. Office, (undated),
https://perma.cc/GD2E-RWKA.
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products from Taiwan are now sold throughout the United
States.65
Another automatically implemented agreement is a 2016
agreement between the United States and Chile concerning a
Chilean distilled spirit. In contrast with the Brandy de Jerez
agreement noted above, the Treasury has treated this agreement
with Chile as part of U.S. law without issuing a ruling, conducting
a rulemaking, or taking any other action. The agreement, concluded by the USTR, commits to protecting the intellectual property rights of a Chilean spirit called “Pajarete.”66 But rather than
add Pajarete to the list of protected spirits in its regulations, the
Treasury has begun treating Pajarete as protected in its work
without any further regulatory action.67 In contrast, in the
Brandy de Jerez example above, the Treasury undertook the additional process of making an internal ruling. In fact, this treatment of Pajarete was not the first instance of the Treasury’s
automatic implementation approach. In 1971, the United States
entered into an agreement to protect the French spirits of
“Armagnac” and “Calvados.”68 For more than twenty years, the
Treasury has treated those spirits as having been incorporated
into the regulations without more.69
What does this mean in practical terms? While we do not
have records of sellers of offending spirits attempting to use forbidden names, government officials have indicated that there
may have been such products and that, if they were identified,
these products would have been rejected.70 The agency has implemented these agreements into its practice without any additional
lawmaking exercise.
With automatic implementation, there is typically no public
information as to the agency’s treatment of the agreement. If the

65 See
GLOBAL
ORGANIC
TRADE
GUIDE,
QUICK
STATS:
TAIWAN
https://perma.cc/DH3M-B78A.
66 Letter from Hon. Michael B. G. Froman, Ambassador, Off. of the U.S. Trade
Representative, to Hon. Andres Rebolledo, Vice Minister for Trade, Chilean Ministry of
Foreign Affs. (Feb. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/R2XL-PYND; Letter from Hon. Michael B. G.
Froman, Ambassador, Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep., to Hon. Magali Silva Velarde-Álvarez,
Minister of Foreign Trade & Tourism, Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Trade & Tourism
(Feb. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/KP7A-NQN5.
67 Email from Karen B. Welch, Dir. of Int’l Affs., Alcohol & Tobacco Tax & Trade
Bureau, to Kathleen Claussen, Prof., Univ. of Miami Sch. of L. (July 9, 2020, 10:44 AM
EDT) (on file with author) [hereinafter Email from Karen B. Welch].
68 Protection of Names of Bourbon Whiskey and Certain French Brandies, U.S.-Fr.,
Mar. 20, 1971, 22 U.S.T. 36.
69 Email from Karen B. Welch, supra note 67.
70 Id.

2022]

Improvised Implementation

1675

agreement is public (which is not always the case) there may be a
press release from an agency announcing its conclusion, but the
agency neither takes any further lawmaking steps nor makes any
public justification nor issues any statement as to its applicability
to relevant actors.
Some agencies follow this practice for agreements that they,
or another agency, call “side letters.” Side letters are agreements
between the United States and another government with whom
the United States already shares an agreement on a broadly related topic. When pressed, agencies have occasionally justified
their automatic implementation through association with the
other agreement—often one to which the letter is said to be “side”
that Congress has implemented with legislation.71 For example, a
2012 “side letter” to the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion
Agreement addressed standards for food safety related to rice between the two countries.72 The agreement modifies the U.S.

71 Occasionally exchanges of letters or other “side agreements” specify that they are
intended to be an “integral part” of another agreement. Surprisingly little work has been
done to investigate the significance of such phrasing, in contrast to some of the literature
and case law on the parallel question in contract law. See, e.g., Letter Exchange on Article 9.15 (Domestic Review of Supplier Challenges) of the United States–Panama Trade
Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Pan., June 28, 2007. See also generally Royce de R. Barondes,
Side Letters, Implementation by Reference and Construction of Contractual Relationships
Memorialized in Multiple Writings, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 651 (2012). What is the domestic
legal significance of an agreement in the form of a side letter that says on its face that it
is to be considered an integral part of another agreement? It may mean, for example, that
the side letter contains obligations that now become subject to dispute resolution clauses
found in the other agreement. Or it may subject the side letter to a sunset clause or exitand-withdrawal provisions, among other conditions. But most letters do not include such
language and have little or no connection to the agreement to which they are said to be
“side,” apart from the common parties. They may be negotiated years after the original
agreement, like the Letter Exchange on Certification Requirements for U.S. Beef and Beef
Products, U.S.-Peru, Mar. 14, 2016, https://perma.cc/7AHD-AZ94, which was concluded
seven years after the U.S.-Peru trade agreement was negotiated. Perhaps more surprisingly, they may also be negotiated years before the original agreement. See, e.g., Letter
from Robert E. Lighthizer, U.S. Trade Rep., to Ildefonso Guajardo Villarreal, Sec. of Econ.,
Mex. (Nov. 30, 2018), https://perma.cc/892T-3YXY (entering into force on Nov. 30, 2018,
two years before the relevant trade agreement (the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement) entered into force on July 1, 2020). It is not uncommon that the agreement to which
a side letter is side may never materialize or may materialize much later. The United
States is a party to side letters with countries that were involved in the Trans-Pacific
Partnership Agreement (TPP) negotiations even though the TPP is not in force. There are
no records of attempts to amend the implementing legislation or separately implement
these letters. Agencies are applying their terms, claiming their implicit implementation
by association, without more. See, e.g., Ian Fergusson & Christopher Davis, Trade Promotion Authority (TPA): Frequently Asked Questions, CONG. RSCH. SERV. 1, 15–16 (June 21,
2019).
72 Agreement on Phytosanitary Measures for Importation of U.S. Paddy Rice, Col.U.S., Apr. 15, 2012, T.I.A.S. 12-415.2.
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Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service phytosanitary certificate and requires USDA inspectors to verify the moisture content
of paddy rice at the time of fumigation.73 The USDA treats the
agreement as part of the Trade Promotion Agreement and implements it automatically without more.74 In some situations involving a side letter, the agency may announce that it is incorporating
the side letter by reference to the earlier agreement such that
whatever force of law was given to the earlier agreement applies
to the side-letter agreement.75
As these examples demonstrate, some agencies consider executive agreements as having been implemented through their
direct use and application by both the agencies themselves and
agency stakeholders, including other agencies. Through automatic implementation, executive agreements perform the role of
ordinary regulations—not just functionally but also legally. They
provide an additional direct means for regulators, businesses, and
foreign governments not just to influence or execute but also to
make law and policy.

***
What is driving agencies’ implementation practices? Two features stand out. First, individual government workers are “choosing their own adventure.”76 Agencies are inconsistent about how
they approach executive agreements, even those that seek to
achieve the same outcomes. Government officials interviewed for
this project expressed concern about the irregularities that they
knew had occurred within their respective agencies.77 Others
could not provide specific information about their implementation
programs, suggesting that at the very least there is no organized

73 Letter from Juan Camilo Restrepo Salazar, Minister of Agric. and Rural Dev., &
Sergio Diaz-Granados, Minister of Trade, Indus. and Tourism, to Ron Kirk, U.S. Trade
Rep. (Apr. 15, 2012), https://perma.cc/C6RM-MTFL.
74 See Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep., Colombia TPA Final Text, https://perma.cc/53A3
-N3TE.
75 On occasion, Congress has debated the incorporation of side letters through this
method. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 108-627, at 31, 39–40 (2004), as reprinted in 2004
U.S.C.C.A.N. 976, 1005, 1012–13.
76 “Choose Your Own Adventure” was a series of children’s gamebooks published
from 1979 to 1998 where each story is written from a second-person point of view with the
reader assuming the role of the protagonist and making choices that determine the main
character’s actions and the plot’s outcome. They can still be found at
https://perma.cc/FY8F-QZA5.
77 Telephone Interview with Former Government Official #1 (July 1, 2020) (on file
with author).

2022]

Improvised Implementation

1677

implementation plan within certain agencies.78 Some suggested
that the agency will do whatever is necessary to operationalize
the agreement and that this was a priority for some members of
Congress.79 Some officials made it clear that the personal approaches of leadership within the agency may influence outcomes,
complicating any formal model that we might seek to identify in
agency practice. Agencies are ad-libbing from agreement to agreement.
Second, agencies are involved in a mix and match method. A
closer look at the negotiation delegations at work in this study
does not provide any clear clues as to which types of issue areas
lend themselves to which types of implementations.80 Procedural
mechanisms are not any more or less common in certain areas of
regulation, including, surprisingly, areas where the executive has
additional latitude to promulgate rules. The areas where an
agency actor has adopted one mechanism or the other do not appear to be based on any legal analysis carried out by the agency.81
Further, it is not clear that procedural implementation is required in any sector or for any agency. Government bureaucrats
suggested that the agency operationalizes its commitments in the
way that the current leadership suggests, or agency custom dictates, which is often informal and not reduced to writing.82
It is difficult to draw patterns among agencies from a limited
set. Each agency official with whom I corresponded acknowledged
challenges; no single agency implements agreements any better
than any other given each agency’s different institutional difficulties. Likewise, there is no pattern linking automatic implementation to certain types of delegations (broad or specific).
We might further ask why agencies are taking the path that
appears to be the path of greater resistance—or at least greater
work—when they have the flexibility to choose. In other words,

78 Interview with Former Government Official #2, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 12, 2020)
(on file with author).
79 Telephone Interview with Former Government Official #3 (June 30, 2020) (on file
with author).
80 Cf. Amichai Cohen, Bureaucratic Internalization: Domestic Governmental Agencies and the Legitimization of International Law, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1079, 1092 (2005)
(claiming, without empirical support, that “congressional attitudes towards incorporating
international law into domestic law differ across issue areas”).
81 To be sure, the State Department has a procedure (the Circular 175 process discussed in detail in Part IV.A.2) intended to confirm that agencies have the authority to
conclude the agreements into which they enter, which ought to also cover some aspects of
implementation, but we lack information about how agencies manage those commitments
once finalized.
82 Interview with Former Government Official #2, supra note 78.
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why undertake procedural implementation at all? But it is not
entirely clear that automatic implementation is the more efficient
choice, even if it might produce less paperwork. Officials still face
the burden of piecemeal application, which may require increased
internal deliberation at a later stage. Here again, no clear patterns emerged to suggest that agencies use more procedure when
they are lobbied in a specific way, when facing congressional oversight, or when they are more worried about enforcement, as we
might expect.83
The next Part carries out a deeper assessment of which aspects (if any) of improvised implementation—whether procedural
or automatic—are worth preserving, according to a set of prudential values, managerial-liberalism principles, and rule of law ideals.
II. VIRTUES AND VICES OF AGENCY AD-LIBBING
One goal of this Article is to shift the debate about agency
cross-border activities away from some of the predominant delegation interrogations to matters of actor, structure, and force after the fact: Who within the branch decides what happens with
an executive agreement once concluded? Through what mechanisms? And to what effect? With these issues in focus, we can better assess the ability of agencies to manage these processes, to
which this Part turns. Rather than evaluate which of the two
types of implementation mechanisms the executive ought to
adopt, I consider whether leaving the choice to the executive
branch to make these critical decisions is the best way to manage
these delicate transnational compromises.
On one hand, the agreement-implementation story may be a
model for those who argue against heavy-handed, stipulated process. Agencies do not appear to be abusing their broad licenses.
In this sense, agreement implementation could prove a counterfactual to traditional policymaking—a successful experiment for
evaluating agency behavior without process. On the other hand,
we do not yet have enough information about the political economy of agreement implementation to reach such a rosy conclusion. It could be that powerful actors are manipulating agency
outcomes through these processes.

83 Individual officials could not share that level of information in our exchanges, but
there may be other ways to trace those trends with additional research and public records
investigation.
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Agreement-implementation choices are not costless or normatively neutral. The implementation process is, just like other
implementation activities in which agencies are engaged, an institutionally embedded process through which international commitments that affect private actors and government resources are
made, and it should be evaluated as such.84 This Part reviews
what is, on the one hand, enhanced flexibility through the ad hoc
nature of executive implementation. On the other hand, the same
flexibility and modularity likewise create inconsistency and uncertainty.
A. Functional Gains
Perhaps surprisingly, the executive’s improvised application
of its implementation mechanisms carries some significant benefits. Under several good-governance metrics, improvised implementation fares reasonably well. It is less obvious how agreement
implementation also promotes, as a value, “form-shopping”—the
ability of agencies to choose among a set of tools including some
that may be subject to lesser scrutiny—and with that, innovation
in agency work.85
The first advantage of the executive’s improvised implementation is efficacy—a premium in statutory implementation that
also attaches with respect to executive agreements. Improvised
implementation, whether through procedural or automatic implementation, gets the job done. As various executive-branch officials
have noted, some of these moves are necessary to effectuate
broader congressional and executive aims.86 Without agency action, the agreements would be dead letters. They would undermine the delegations that motivated and mandated them. Agencies are achieving goals set out for them by Congress, at least
within certain bounds. If the outcomes were widely undesirable,
private stakeholders and members of Congress might raise more
criticism about the structural frames through which these practices are carried out.

84

See Rubin, supra note 18, at 426.
This is obviously a play on words of “forum shop,” but unlike that term (which
often has negative connotation), I use the term here positively, like the way Professor
Pamela Bookman does in her extensive litigation analysis. Pamela K. Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 579 (2017).
86 See generally The President’s 2020 Trade Pol’y Agenda: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Ways and Means, 116th Cong. (2020) (testimony of Robert Lighthizer, U.S.
Trade Rep.) [hereinafter Lighthizer Testimony 2020].
85
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Improvised implementation also often helps facilitate transnational regulation more efficiently. It responds, often promptly,
to the international needs that called for an agreement in the first
place. It avoids congressional interference that could prove problematic in our foreign affairs relationships and complicate U.S.
compliance with the binding international commitments made to
foreign partners.87 If the executive branch entered into an agreement that Congress could easily dismantle, foreign partners
would have little incentive to take U.S. negotiators seriously.88
Permitting the executive widespread latitude to implement international commitments generally strengthens international law:
having negotiated the agreement, the executive is more likely to
be invested in taking steps to implement it than other actors
might be.
Expertise is another key feature of the executive’s improvised
implementation methods. Relying on its broad reach and collaboration across the administrative state, the executive can choose
how to make use of its expertise in manners for which the executive is uniquely suited. Agencies may draw from the executive’s
community of experts to apply those experts’ specialized
knowledge at the implementation stage just as they do at the negotiation stage.
Somewhat ironically, improvised implementation also can reinforce democratic principles through its public-participation opportunities. On the whole, public participation in implementation
is better than it is at the agreement-negotiation stage, at least
where procedural implementation mechanisms are used. If there
will be any formal collection of public comment, it is likely to be
during the transposition of the agreement into regulations. Thus,
improvised implementation may have enriched accountability in
the life cycles of our international agreements.89 By engaging the
public in the implementation of the agreement, international lawmaking activities may be fortified where they matter most—as
part of U.S. law. To be sure, for scholars who advocate for public

87 This argument resonates with those surrounding the legislative veto that once accompanied some of these delegations, even if at a high bar. See, e.g., Harold Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking after I.N.S. v. Chadha, 18 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 1191, 1201 (1986).
88 This is one of the arguments for fast-track legislation for free-trade agreements.
See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV.
799, 803 (1995) (“The Trade Act of 1974 made a comprehensive effort to restructure the
modern two-House procedure to suit the needs of economic diplomacy.”).
89 See Sitaraman, supra note 23, at 557 (commenting on the work of others).
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participation throughout the international-lawmaking process,90
participation in implementation would be only a second-best outcome to collecting public input at the negotiation stage. Still, our
present implementation mechanisms at least permit engagement
on how those commitments are given force—a space where the
agency has the flexibility to pick and choose and where the public
could influence those choices.
Perhaps the greatest benefit of executive implementation is
its flexibility and the space it creates for innovation.91 The present
constructive ambiguity permits agencies both to make new law
that might not be available through ordinary domestic channels
and to operationalize those agreements in ways that fall off the
beaten path. One official recounted that the bureaucrats in their
agency were able to craft their own customized way forward with
a deal in light of these liberties.92 Other officials described informal strategies and plans that their agencies developed that were
not publicly known but that put an agreement into effect.93 While
agencies are not developing expansive new constructs to manage
executive agreements or inventing unusual and exceptional
devices, some of them are developing more unorthodox agency
tools, consistent with what Professors Abbe Gluck, Anne Joseph
O’Connell, and Rosa Po have described in the domestic space.94
Some agency solutions have been bespoke, capitalizing on the creativity of agency experts and the innovation space left to them by
the statute.95

90

See generally, e.g., Presidential Power, supra note 9.
Certainly, while we sometimes value flexibility as a means of giving agency to
actors to tailor their approaches in problem-solving, as discussed further below, the virtues of flexibilities themselves are limited to the extent they contribute to delayed
decision-making or interference. See David Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV.
1375, 1382–98 (2011).
92 Telephone Interview with Former Government Official #2, supra note 78 (describing the USTR’s strategy for implementing a trade-related executive agreement).
93 Telephone Interview with Former Government Official #1, supra note 77.
94 See generally Abbe Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell & Rosa Po, Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789 (2015).
95 Agreement implementation is not the only space in which agencies have pushed
the boundaries of their institutional constraints and developed their own procedures. In
the early days of the APA, agencies “were forced to develop supplementary fact-gathering
procedures,” leading to courts adding extra procedural requirements to rulemaking until
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Reactor Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S.
519 (1978). Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive
Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 257 (1986). Those supplementary procedures were quickly policed
by the courts and by Congress to ensure their consistency with delegated and constitutional intent. By contrast, in the agreement-implementation space, without judicial policing, these innovations are rarely curtailed and more often embraced.
91
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Improvised implementation without more also permits the
branch an opportunity to “form shop.” Occasionally, an agency or
group of agencies may be empowered to address a substantive issue through multiple avenues: through ordinary administrative
law tools as directed by Congress or through agreement. This opportunity to choose makes executive agreements somewhat
unique among bi-branch international lawmaking tools which involve the Senate or both houses of Congress in approval and implementation, but not entirely unique among domestic lawmaking tools.96 Not all domestic statutory directives to agencies
include specific instruction on agencies’ choice of form for implementation so in that sense agreement implementation is not particularly distinctive. Agencies often have broad leeway as to the
format for statutory implementation, such as choosing between
notice-and-comment rulemaking or some other executive-branch
tool, like a presidential proclamation or agency ruling, to put
these obligations into effect.97 The “choice of form” privilege affords agencies multiple mechanisms for implementation that are
often informal and distinct from the traditionally regulated
groups including published guidance, handbooks, and even websites.98 While legal scholars have wrestled with the payoffs and
perils of form shopping,99 it may have an underestimated benefit:
choice of form may permit increased space for collaboration, for

96 See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
1383, 1403–05 (2004). See also Peter M. Shane, Federal Policy Making by Consent Decree:
An Analysis of Agency and Judicial Discretion, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 241, 241 (1987)
(“Many significant federal administrative decisions are not subject to any great procedural
constraint as to their timing, origination, or format. To the extent administrative decisions
are limited by congressionally imposed substantive criteria, those criteria frequently leave
broad leeway for ultimate implementation.”).
97 See, e.g., Magill, supra note 96; see also Peter L. Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1466 (1992) (“Although commonly we speak of ‘rulemaking’ as
synonymous with the notice-and-comment procedures of informal legislative rulemaking
under section 553, careful attention to the APA reveals four different species of activity
that can produce an outcome that fits the definition of ‘rule.’”).
98 See William N. Eskridge Jr., Expanding Chevron’s Domain: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of the Relative Competence of Courts and Agencies to Interpret Statutes,
2013 WIS. L. REV. 411, 419 (2013).
99 See David Zaring, Rulemaking and Adjudication in International Law, 46 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 563, 566 (2008) (“Ronald Coase claimed that economic actors were faced
with a choice between creating relationships through firms or through contracts, and
Yochai Benkler posited that the choice between open source and other legal arrangements
is a signal feature of cyberlaw.”)
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originality, and for supporting international arrangements.100 If,
in deploying that duty, agencies are in a position to enhance U.S.
foreign commitments, form shopping may become a greater asset
than previously anticipated, at least to international legal positivists. In fact, it may be necessary to accommodate this unusual
intersection of responsibilities that has resulted from disparate
delegations to the executive over the last several decades, even as
it may be beyond the capacity or interest of courts to review.101
The implementation mechanisms also may achieve aims that
other tools do not permit. That includes implementations in the
absence of an express delegation to make an agreement, although
there is some uncertainty on this question. The expansive space
for agreement implementation may suggest that when Congress
provides a blanket delegation to, say, the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to provide guidance on foreign-facing
clean-air technology, the EPA may enter into an agreement on
that basis. Agencies now count international agreements among
their available tools when choosing from the toolkit. The lax oversight in implementation may incentivize and enable them to negotiate where they otherwise would not have done so, further
strengthening international partnerships.
Unexpectedly, the present approach to agreement implementation facilitates opportunities for execution and administration.
It also helps to identify prospects for implementation without the
need for congressional direction. For these reasons, this improvised, off-the-cuff activity among agencies may be prudentially
appropriate. Much like in the domestic regulatory context, the bureaucrats and interest groups that are able to make use of the
executive branch are among the winners in the current institutional arrangement. Likewise, some international partners benefit. But these advantages come at a cost. Just as the executive’s
ad hoc agreement implementation can be a salutary means by
which to address transnational regulatory needs in a globalized
environment, it also has drawbacks to which the next Section
turns.

100 Professor Evan Criddle has suggested that agencies still have a fiduciary duty of
care and loyalty in choosing among the tools that they are provided. Evan J. Criddle, Fiduciary Foundations of Administrative Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 117, 157–59 (2006); see also
John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 945 (2004).
101 See Shane, supra note 96, at 241–42 (describing the limits on judicial action).
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B. Institutional Risks
Although the opportunities laid out above provide some good
reasons to permit agencies to choose from a wide range of mechanisms, including on a case-by-case basis, there are downsides for
private actors and foreign partners. Indeed, some of the same features identified as benefits themselves pose difficulties.
First, whether in circumstances of procedural implementation or automatic implementation, both private and government
actors face substantial uncertainty.102 There is no predictability
in mechanism, in outcome, or in force of law.103 The executive gets
to pick the commitment, the strength and length of the commitment as a matter of U.S. law, and the oversight of the commitment. While the legal community widely accepts a degree of
agency discretion with respect to these areas of executive expertise (as discussed above), that discretion is subject to administrative safeguards that are missing here, given that judicial supervision remains spotty at best. Agencies can drop practices more
easily with more informal means of implementation and often can
drop practices more easily overall. The potential fickleness of executive implementation prompts concerns regarding the international commitments’ uncertain durability. These arrangements
have the potential to create discrepancies at the domestic and international levels.104
Second, the present use of diverse ad hoc mechanisms risks
inter- and intra-agency conflicts. There is no clear reason that
agencies need to adopt a singular mechanism, but there may be
an issue where two or more agencies are involved in implementation. A close examination of such executive agreements
demonstrates that international commitments often have multiple agency homes. As discussed above in the context of form shopping, several agencies may have the authority to regulate or negotiate on a particular subject. Leaving the agreement’s
implementation to an interagency debate may mean more controversy over not just form but also substance.

102 Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 515–16 (2008) (“This uncertainty could hobble the
United States’ efforts to negotiate and sign international agreements.”).
103 Part III reviews the enforceability issues posed by improvised implementation.
104 For example, in the distilled-spirits examples, on some occasions, the U.S. government and its trading partners have pursued additional agreements as to the same product—perhaps for the avoidance of doubt or to resolve any lingering questions about their
effect. See Multiple Pathways, supra note 59, at 282 (listing several spirits that have been
the subject of more than one agreement).
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The interagency relationships create both vertical and horizontal complexity. Both within individual agencies and among
them, bureaucrats report differences of opinion on implementation. These are the consequences of conflicting or at best indeterminate authority over the same federal statutory terrain. It is not
difficult to envision how this uncertainty could unfold. With such
blurry procedural norms, improvised implementation runs the
risk that one agency commits to a set of rules that the other refuses to execute—with concomitant questions as to what law prevails at the border.105 The executive must sort out those conflicts
since Congress rarely does so. We lack guidance on how to mediate between and among agencies when Congress provides concurrent authority to regulate but is ambiguous as to how that authority ought to be allocated when it comes to agreement
implementation.
Third, process scholars likewise ought to view improvised implementation with suspicion. In ordinary domestic lawmaking, an
agency does not have to explain, when challenged, why it chose a
particular policymaking form.106 But that freedom “does not mean
that the agency is free to design its policymaking tools.”107 While
agencies can often choose among statutory mandates and select
their executory tools among a closed set, they do so subject to procedural constraints.108 That is how Congress ensures some degree
of oversight or public participation consistent with the primary
values of administrative law.
Executive implementation of executive agreements, however,
does not benefit from the checks and balances built into our administrative procedures except when the executive selects to use
them.109 This absence sets up conditions ripe for one agency to

105 One official put it this way: “USTR usually looks to [another agency] to ask, ‘Can
you guys deliver?’ and [the other agency] would consider what was required under existing
regulations.” Telephone Interview with Former Agency Official (June 24, 2020) (on file
with author).
106 See Magill, supra note 96, at 1403–05; see also Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194, 201–03:

[P]roblems may arise in a case which the administrative agency could not reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved despite the absence of a relevant
general rule. Or the agency may not have had sufficient experience with a particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and
fast rule . . . the agency must retain power to deal with the problems on a caseto-case basis if the administrative process is to be effective.
107

Magill, supra note 96, at 1404–05 (emphasis in original).
Id.
109 Cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1751 (2007) (“Administrative procedures are the mechanism that,
together with judicial review, facilitates such congressional involvement.”). As noted
108
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drift into the regulatory space of another, enabled by the openendedness of agreements and their expansive implementation
space. In drift, it is not that agencies share concurrent regulatory
jurisdiction but rather some other combination (or lack) of delegation to achieve transnational aims. For example, in the
distilled-spirits examples, the USTR is empowered to make trade
policy while the Treasury has notice-and-comment authority to
approve foreign distilled spirits. But in recent years, the USTR
has been negotiating protections as part of its trade policy and
asking the Treasury to implement those protections through
other administrative means.
Under the present application and executive-branch interpretation, the executive can choose executive agreements to reach
an intended outcome even when Congress has provided that
determinations in that area are to be made through
notice-and-comment rulemaking as seen in the distilled-spirits
example.110 Agencies can then use automatic-implementation
strategies to shield themselves from scrutiny when it comes to the
original delegation.
Fourth, another consequence of indiscriminate diversity
among agencies in incorporating international agreement commitments is that not all international commitments are implemented equally. Different agencies have treated executive agreements in different ways: Some have undertaken to integrate them
into agency rules and regulations. Others have treated them as
directly applicable to private actors from their inception. Even
within individual agencies, officials have not treated executive
agreements uniformly. Some commitments and agreements get
memorialized in domestic statutes, while others are relegated to
executive actions, and still others remain wholly outside the system. The process is selective and unequal.
Foreign actors are unlikely to miss these differences. The institutional costs of these amorphous arrangements for implementation are only compounded by their complications for our foreign
affairs. With courts largely out of the picture, agencies encounter
still greater pressure to manage not just their subsequent interactions with private parties but also their foreign relationships.
above, courts have either confirmed the existence of an original delegation, or they have
otherwise avoided the question. These decisions offer few meaningful principles for more
recent executive agreements that do not share the same features as those agreements.
110 As noted in Part I.A, Congress has delegated authority to the executive to promulgate regulations on distilled spirits even though the executive has used agreements that
are automatically implemented in lieu of regulations. Telephone Interview with Former
U.S. Treasury Official (June 24, 2020) (on file with author).
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Fifth, any benefits of flexibility are mitigated by the fact that
the executive’s flexibility is partly enabled by a lack of transparency. This metric poses additional challenges for agreement implementation. With only occasional public participation and almost no transparency required in their implementation work,
agencies appear to perform poorly on administrative law’s common currency of accountability.111 Acting beneath the surface of
the public eye may mean that the risk of self-aggrandizement is
greater than in other areas of regulation.
Apart from these rather practical institutional weaknesses in
improvised implementation, there is also the question of whether
improvised implementation’s functional strengths justify its
questionable legitimacy. For instance, procedural implementation struggles with its predetermined outcomes, making the administrative lawmaking process moot and possibly violating the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).112 Automatic implementation, while successful in giving force to our international commitments, lacks any principled criteria. In the absence of ex ante designs, the justification for agency functionalism in improvised
implementation is that it may be necessary and can help our domestic-international system do the work it needs to do in the absence of an ordinary process of law. That results in significant
pressure from the executive’s choose-your-own-adventure approach on the original delegation from Congress that we submit
to virtually no scrutiny. These are tradeoffs to consider: between
effectuating agreements, realizing an implied vision of Congress,
and wasting resources; and between problem-solving and reliability.
Apart from these prudential issues and the risks of creating
losers of different varieties in improvised implementation, one
primary legal difficulty comes to light: enforceability. The uncertainties surrounding agreement implementation may mean that
the obligations found in these agreements, their enforceability,
and their preemptive authority will come under question. The
next Part takes up these thorny issues in detail.

111 See Gluck et al., supra note 94, at 1839 (noting that the “legitimacy values that
are common currency for courts in this field” are “public participation, transparency, and
accountability”).
112 See Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). The two bodies of law appear to clash. Congress does not provide a
workaround, for example, to reconcile the implementation of agreement commitments
with the delegation to an agency to prescribe regulations to achieve the same.
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III. THE THREE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR IMPLEMENTATION
This Part sketches three possible approaches to explaining
how executive agreements become part of U.S. law. Each approach developed in this Part analogizes the executive-agreement
experience to another body of implementation law. Identifying
these competing approaches helps demonstrate that the disciplinary and jurisprudential lens through which we view the executive’s implementation of agreements dictates their substantive
law, procedure, and policy. While each seeks to explain the same
agency activity, the choice of applicable theoretical model has legal consequences.
When the Department of Commerce’s National Institute of
Standards and Technology agrees with its Mexican counterpart
that it “shall grant applications for equipment certification” in relation to certain technologies from Mexico, for example, is that
enforceable as a matter of U.S. law?113 Can U.S. importers enforce
that commitment in a U.S. court? Does it matter whether the
agency acted as part of the Department of Commerce’s general
authority to “develop, maintain, and retain custody of the national standards of measurement”?114 Or if Congress instructed
the Department of Commerce specifically to negotiate agreements on certifications and applications? What if the Department
of Commerce engages in some administrative lawmaking regarding that commitment? What if these obligations conflict with a
statute or regulation?
Note that this is a modern variant of the prototypical case
that initially gave rise to controversies over treaty self-execution
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In those situations,
there was a conflict between a statute and a treaty: a statute directed a customs official to charge a tariff of a certain number of
dollars on a particular import; however, a treaty directed that
same customs official to charge a lower (or zero) tariff on that
same import.115 The resolution of that conflict was that whichever
was later in time controls, between the statute or the treaty.116
113 See, e.g., Mutual Recognition Agreement Between the Government of the United
States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States for Conformity Assessment of Telecommunications Equipment, U.S.-Mex., app. B, May 26, 2011, TIAS 11610. There are many similar agreements, especially with our close trading partners, regarding recognition of facilities and standards on topics from avocados to tires. See generally Mini-Deals, supra note 4, at 337–52 (describing the hundreds of executive agreements
related to foreign commerce into which the United States has entered).
114 15 U.S.C. § 272(b)(2) (2015).
115 See SLOSS, supra note 30, at 107–28.
116 See, e.g., id. at 107.
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The primary justification for the later-in-time rule was that treaties and statutes have equal rank within the U.S. legal system.117
That argument is hard to square here, but the practices suggest
that some agencies may consider executive agreements to have
equal rank, even if only on instinct.118
These are meaty and meaningful legal questions that one
might expect to be litigated. But agreement-implementation issues have not been litigated in their modern manifestations.119
There are almost no examples of challenges to implementation or
cases concerning these agreements’ legal status. Courts have
avoided the issue either through express application of an exception or disclaimed institutional competence.120 As a result, power

117

See id.
There is no evidence that agency personnel are thinking about force-of-law impacts
in their improvised implementation calculus, even if observers see those impacts as a guiding issue to such a determination.
119 Nearly all the discussion in this literary and judicial conversation examines treaties, but some courts have briefly addressed the self-executing status of sole executive
agreements. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 415 (2003); Dames & Moore
v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680 (1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330 (1937); see also De Archibold v. United States, 499
F.3d 1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“If Congress had intended to confer jurisdiction on the
federal courts for claims arising under treaties and executive agreements carte blanche,
Congress would have clearly stated so.”).
120 In one case, the Court of International Trade avoided addressing an implementation challenge indirectly. Almond Brothers v. United States, 34 C.I.T. 370, 371 (2010).
That case involved several executive agreements between Canada and the United States
that were intended to resolve ongoing disputes between the two countries relating to the
softwood-lumber trade. See Softwood Lumber Agreement Between the Government of
Canada and the Government of the United States of America, U.S.-Can., Sept. 12, 2006,
https://perma.cc/K66E-JA9C. U.S. producers of softwood-lumber products brought the
case regarding, among other topics, a provision in one of the agreements that provided for
Canada to distribute $500 million to certain U.S. producers who were members of a particular coalition. Almond Brothers, 34 C.I.T. at 371. An underlying difficulty on which the
court’s jurisdiction partly turned was the status in U.S. law of the 1996 Softwood Lumber
Agreement. The court considered briefly whether that agreement was a product of a 1991
agency investigation on the same topic but did not reach a determination. Id. at 381–82.
See also Clark, supra note 26, at 1595 (“[A] real or perceived lack of institutional competence might lead [courts] to accord substantial deference to the political branches’ decision
to make an agreement rather than a treaty.”).
The absence of judicial guidance here is made more surprising by the fact that, as
Professor Harlan Cohen has noted, the Supreme Court has focused its attention on domestic implementation and implementation matters when dealing with international instruments. See Harlan G. Cohen, The Death of Deference and the Domestication of Treaty Law,
2015 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1467, 1468–69 (2015) (“Rather than focusing on the treaty and what
its terms might mean in relations between the United States and others, the Court has
been turning the question inward, focusing on implementing legislation, congressional intent, and ordinary methods of statutory interpretation.”).
118
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has shifted precisely to those entities that the law currently does
not have established ways to hold accountable.121
Any of the frameworks for thinking about agreement implementation that are analyzed in this Part could inform the way
that courts manage these challenges as they arise. As this analysis of the frameworks shows, some of our existing canons are reasonably suited to address the interpretive questions raised by executive implementation, but ultimately, they are insufficient for
the complexities and idiosyncrasies of executive agreements.
A. Domestic Administration
The first of the three frameworks for thinking about agreement implementation is founded on principles of domestic administration. This approach to theorizing agreement implementation
imports administrative law concepts to understand and explain
agency actions. It relies on analogies to the way agencies implement statutes and sees procedural and automatic implementation
as typical agency work, just with a foreign element.
A champion of this approach sees procedural implementation
as another form of informal rulemaking. An agency acts upon a
delegation to it to negotiate an agreement. The agency then takes
an additional lawmaking step to give those commitments force of
law. In the case of the salmon agreement above, the Commerce
Department carried out a notice-and-comment rulemaking; in the
case of the Brandy de Jerez agreement, the Treasury issued a formal ruling; in the case of the St. Lawrence Seaway toll agreement,
the Department of Transportation issued a rule.122 As in domestic
regulation, the agency has executed the congressional mandate,
just through an additional step.
Likewise, this domestic-administration model sees automatic
implementation as a form of ordinary agency adjudication. An
121 Whether agreement commitments have the “force of law” is not always in doubt.
Some agreements on their face do not claim to make any commitments for anyone—they
are non-binding agreements or expressions of policy supported by the government. For
example, Trade and Investment Framework Agreements (TIFAs) fall into this category.
See, e.g., Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Concerning the Development of Trade and
Investment Relations, U.S.-Nig., Feb. 16, 2000, https://perma.cc/FHB2-7NBF. These sorts
of agreements establish U.S. influence, capacity building, and dialogue. No further lawmaking is required to put them into effect. Non-binding agreements need not occupy much
space in this discussion, although some agencies build institutional structures around
non-binding executive agreements that may give rise to later binding rules that the agency
must implement. Moreover, debates surrounding bindingness often divide agencies and
branches with implications for their implementation.
122 See supra Introduction.
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agency decides a case on an individualized basis in the shadow of
the executive agreement. For example, in the case of the organics
agreement with Taiwan, the agency agreed to admit foods from
Taiwan with the Taiwanese organic seal.123 The decision by the
official at the border to allow the marked food to enter in light of
the commitment in the agreement is, on this view, an adjudication—just like the USDA’s treatment of U.S. organic products. In
other words, in both scenarios the federal agency makes a decision on a particular group of organic products premised on some
other guiding document: in the former, it is the agreement; in the
latter, it may be a statute or regulation.
The domestic administrative framework domesticates the
agreement experience, fitting the agreement and its implementation into familiar boxes of the agency’s work at home.124 The
agency is simply doing what it does in ordinary agency practice.
Procedural implementation often leads to rules or rule-like pronouncements, and automatic implementation generally involves
case-by-case action on the basis of a preexisting directive.
Adopting this perspective on agency implementation behavior also means interpreting the original delegation to negotiate
as one that implicitly permits implementation. The domesticadministration proponent views the agency as acting in response
to an implied delegation of authority to implement the agreement,
not just to negotiate it, consistent with leading administrative
law thinking on purposivism in delegation.125 The agency discerns
that the purpose of the delegation is to not only negotiate but to
give effect to the commitments it negotiates and implements consistent with those congressional aims and principles. Congress is
using the executive branch as its agent here and deploying one of
its many process controls by giving the agency broad berth on implementation.126
Analogizing to domestic regulatory processes carries legal
consequences for enforceability. Under this view, the agreement
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See supra note 10.
I use “domesticate” rather than “normalize” purposely. Cf. Ganesh Sitaraman &
Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897,
1968–70 (2015) (discussing normalization’s unfinished business as relevant to executive
agreements).
125 See Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch: How Agencies Interpret
Statutes, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 871, 875–76 (2015) (explaining how agencies seek to discern
the purpose of the statute as part of their interpretation).
126 This could be an additional control to the ones Professor Rebecca Ingber identified
in her recent important work. See Rebecca Ingber, Congressional Administration of Foreign Affairs, 106 VA. L. REV. 395, 412–37 (2020).
124
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itself has no force of law. Rather, the commitments within the
agreement become enforceable through agency action—action
that the agency may or may not choose to take. Further, insofar
as agencies execute a process consistent with the APA that results
in the issuance of a rule or the conventional outcome of an
adjudication, the APA may apply to agency implementation activities. That premise does not clearly resolve the question as to
whether the agency may then invoke an APA foreign relations
exception should its actions be challenged, but at least
arbitrary-and-capricious review would apply.127 Thus, under the
domestic-administration model, the agreement has no legal force;
its content acquires legal force through its implementation, and
those processes are subject to review. Although there are very few
judicial challenges to executive agreements, one could imagine
that this domestic-administration approach to conceiving of
agreement implementation might appeal to judges or courts accustomed to administrative law models, like the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia.
The domestic-administration model normalizes executive
agreement implementation as ordinary agency activity and does
little to acknowledge the transnational features.128 Under this approach, agreement implementation is not particularly distinctive
in outcome or in output. But this is not the only view.
B. International Affairs
A second approach to explaining and understanding agreement implementation is what I term the “international-affairs approach.” An internationalist is likely to mediate the agreement
experience through the prism of treaties. Where the domesticadministration model analogizes to statutes, the internationalaffairs model analogizes the executive agreement situation to
treaty doctrine.129
The longstanding treaty implementation debate is about the
status of treaties in U.S. law—that is, whether they are automat-

127

Sitaraman, supra note 23, at 494.
This framework relies on a formalist conceptualization of administrative law.
There may be alternative domestication theories that are less rigid, but for now this offers
a reasonable proxy.
129 Treaties, as the term is used here, are international agreements that the United
States has joined in accordance with the U.S. Constitution’s Treaty Clause. U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
128
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ically enforceable in U.S. courts (self-executing) or whether an additional implementation step is required (non-self-executing).130
Treaty doctrine, in contrast to domestic doctrines on statutes, determines the force of law of a treaty and its implementation based
on standards considered to be objective and determinable through
courts. Federal courts have frequently reviewed and occasionally
refined the analysis as to the indicators and proper interpretation
of self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.131
The international-affairs approach to executive agreement
implementation tries to track and apply those same principles
and terms to executive agreements. Thus, it interprets procedural
implementation as action in service of a non-self-executing agreement and automatic implementation as the operation of a selfexecuting agreement.
Seeing procedural implementation as akin to implementing
a non-self-executing treaty means that the agreement itself does
not have the force of law; rather, the subsequent lawmaking steps
create binding law. One can again see this best through a comparative example. In 1997, the United States entered into the
Chemical Weapons Convention, which provides that “[e]ach State
Party shall . . . adopt the necessary measures to implement its
obligations under this Convention.”132 That Convention is not selfexecuting, but it creates binding obligations on the United States.
For example, each party to the Convention much “designate or
establish a National Authority to serve as the national focal point
for effective liaison . . . with other States Parties.”133 Subsequently, Congress implemented the relevant provisions of the
130 See Carlos Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT’L
L. 695, 695 (1995) (“A distinction has become entrenched in United States law between
treaties that are ‘self-executing’ and those that are not. The precise nature of this distinction—indeed, its very existence—is a matter of some controversy and much confusion.”);
United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876 (5th Cir. 1979) (“The self-execution question is
perhaps one of the most confounding in treaty law.”). The treaty implementation debate
has raged for several decades, spurred most recently by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2009) (holding that even if an international treaty may
constitute an international commitment, it is not binding domestic law unless either
Congress has enacted statutes implementing the treaty or the treaty is self-executing); see
also STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL32528, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFECT UPON U.S. LAW 15–23 (2018). But see Rebecca Crootof, Judicious Influence: Non-Self-Executing Treaties and the Charming Betsy Canon, 120 YALE
L.J. 1784 (2011) (arguing that those distinctions are less important than some suggest).
131 See Jackson, supra note 31, at 318 (commenting that “[h]ierarchy of norms refers
to the questions that arise when a directly applicable and invocable treaty norm is unavoidably inconsistent with other norms in the national legal system”).
132 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. VII(1), Jan. 13, 1993.
133 Id. at art. VII(4).
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Convention by passing legislation undertaking those
obligations.134
Compare that experience to those set out above as instances
of procedural implementation. An agency enters into an executive
agreement with another government that features a similar provision (for example, that each party will adopt certain measures
to prevent the development and use of chemical weapons).135 After
the agreement’s entry into force, the agency would issue regulations that adopt that provision.
As this example shows, applying a treaty model to agreements requires seeing both the partnerships and the players as
having shifted. In the context of treaties, it is widely accepted that
the legislature decides and constructs the implementation mechanism.136 Indeed, treaty formalists might reject this interpretation and extension to executive-agreement practice by agencies on
that basis. From a formalist perspective, Congress is the only
branch that is entitled to transform those international commitments into domestic commitments.137 But other scholars tend to
134 Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–277,
112 Stat. 2681–856 (1998). This practice is longstanding. See, e.g., Migratory Bird Treaty
Act, c. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1918). Sometimes the Senate confirms that no implementing legislation was needed. S. EXEC. REPT. 109-6, at 6 (2005). Implementing legislation may include various types of provisions: changes to U.S. law, institutional creation, and often
some further delegation. Such legislation need neither follow immediately after the entry
into force of the agreement nor name the agreement. For an example, see Ana Maria
Merico-Stephens, Of Federalism, Human Rights, and the Holland Caveat, 25 MICH. J.
INT’L L. 265 (2004) (arguing that the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights was implemented into U.S. law through the Violence Against Women Act).
135 For illustrative purposes, I am assuming agency authority to enter into such an
agreement. Sample agreements with corresponding delegations are set out in Part I.
136 Medellín, 552 U.S. at 494 (“[T]he responsibility for transforming an international
obligation arising from a non-self-executing treaty into domestic law falls to Congress, not
the Executive.”); see also Galbraith, supra note 23, 1316–20 (describing how Congress implements treaties).
137 But see Paul B. Stephan, Open Doors, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 11, 23 (2009)
(arguing that the president should be able to implement non-self-executing treaties); Edward T. Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 353 (2008) (arguing
that the Take Care Clause ought to be read to permit the president to implement some
non-self-executing treaties). Professor Jean Galbraith does not rule out that the executive
could implement a treaty, but she argues that the text of the treaty should contain such a
delegation or the Senate’s resolution of advice and consent should specify such a delegation. See Galbraith, supra note 23, at 1355. Some commentators have explored other prospects for executive implementation of a treaty. David A. Koplow, When Is an Amendment
Not an Amendment?: Modification of Arms Control Agreements without the Senate, 59 U.
CHI. L. REV. 981, 1008–14 (1992) (discussing implementation of a treaty via executive
agreement, among other tools, and the congressional debates surrounding those questions). As for implementing legislation that gives the executive regulatory authority as
part of a treaty’s implementation, the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 give the EPA
authority to implement a treaty: the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
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freely apply these ideas to agency action, concluding that with executive agreements, agencies assume this legislative role on their
own.138 That agencies are in this alone, apart from the other
branches, is an element absent from the treaty experience, but
the concepts track otherwise.
Seeing automatic implementation as akin to self-execution
means that no further steps are needed to give the agreement
commitment the force of law. The terms of such treaties apply directly in U.S. courts.139 In the same way, agencies directly apply
the terms of executive agreements that they consider to be automatically implemented.
Looking at agreement implementation through this lens, as
compared to the domestic administration lens, is not just a matter
of terminology. Rather than reviewing the procedural integrity of
the agency action, as would be the emphasis in the domestic administration model, a court adopting this approach would instead
review the agreement and interrogate the agency’s interpretation
of it to determine whether the automatic implementation was appropriate and the agreement enforceable.140
The international-affairs framework may be particularly attractive to courts and advocates that either are accustomed to international activities, like the U.S. Court of International Trade,
or are readily engaged with treaties. The international-affairs
model is likely to resonate with experienced foreign relations and
treaty practitioners. In fact, some commentators have simply assumed that executive agreements and treaties go together—that
they are treated the same way with respect to enforceability.141
That view is supported by indiscriminate lumping by the judiciary.142 Courts have sometimes drafted opinions in catchall terms
using the wording “international obligations” but actually only

Ozone Layer. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat 2399
(1990).
138 See, e.g., Treaties’ End, supra note 3, at 1321.
139 See Andrew Solomon and Katherine Brantingham, When Can an Individual Enforce a Right Set Forth in an International Treaty?, ASIL SIDEBAR (July 2006),
https://perma.cc/T8SL-8ND7; cf. Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 215 (2014) (noting
that the Chemical Weapons Convention is not self-executing).
140 The Court in Medellín describes its textual review of treaties. 552 U.S. at 514–15.
141 Others have independently suggested that there is a norm among congressionalexecutive agreements that they are self-executing, see Treaties’ End, supra note 3, at 1321,
but agency practice suggests otherwise..
142 See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution,
and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1956 (1999) (collecting cases);
Senate Report 2001, supra note 43, at 86 (assuming, without explanation, extension to
executive agreements).
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drawing from treaty or treaty-styled examples in their discussion.143
Some internationalists find additional support for this approach in long-standing doctrine concerning sole executive agreements: agreements negotiated pursuant to the president’s inherent powers. The Supreme Court has held that those types of
agreements are self-executing.144 Internationalists contend that
the case for considering other executive agreements to be selfexecuting, or automatically implemented, is even stronger than
the case made for sole executive agreements. Those proponents
suggest that because Congress has provided a delegation to support the executive’s work, there is an even stronger basis for seeing them as automatically implemented with the force of domestic
law.145
This model also carries with it a nuanced understanding of
the underlying negotiating delegation to the agency. According to
this view, Congress makes two types of delegations: one according
to which the agency is tasked with negotiating a non-selfexecuting agreement and another according to which the agency
may enter into a self-executing agreement.146 Various criteria may
be identified that help the agency discern under which of the two
delegations it acts, even if they are not expressly elaborated by
Congress or the agency.147
This reading serves the same purpose as the domesticadministration model’s view of an implicit delegation to implement, but it carries different conclusions. For one, a self-executing
agreement is not necessarily subject to the same administrative
law protections as the adjudication activities of the agency would
be. Seeing the agreement as self-executing treats it as statute rather than subjecting the agency’s action under it to scrutiny. For

143 See, e.g., Medellín, 552 U.S. at 525–26 (referring to international obligations without further distinction in a case about a treaty).
144 See Pink, 315 U.S. at 229; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330.
145 E-mail from Former State Department Official #4 to Kathleen Claussen, Prof.,
Univ. of Miami Sch. of L. (Dec. 7, 2020) (on file with author).
146 See MULLIGAN, supra note 130, at 15–16 (finding that international agreements
that would require the United States to exercise authority that the Constitution exclusively assigns to Congress must be deemed non-self-executing and that implementing legislation is required to give such provisions domestic legal effect).
147 Identifying the distinction in the original delegation is not something that any
government official said was part of his or her typical exercise. Indeed, a comparison of a
handful of delegations and the resulting agreements does not suggest any common features among the first group as compared to the second.
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another, it may mean that the agreement supersedes agency action or earlier-in-time legislative action.148 Thus, choosing between the domestic and international frameworks means choosing between different force-of-law outcomes.
C. Constitutional Incapacity
Not all observers accept improvised implementation as appropriate or legal. Another view disputes the application of statutes or treaty doctrines in this context. I call this view the
“constitutional-incapacity framework.” The incapacity proponent
takes issue with agencies’ treatment of the underlying delegations and finds that the executive branch lacks authority to undertake any type of implementation without additional, express
delegation. On that basis, the incapacity advocate rejects the legal soundness of the implementation mechanisms entirely.
This position contests the domestic-administration model’s
suggestion that Congress is implicitly permitting the executive to
incorporate agreements into U.S. law as it sees fit; it also rejects
the international-affairs model’s position that Congress is implicitly delegating decisions about execution. The incapacity advocate
maintains that such a carte blanche approach would be surprising if true, given how much Congress has rebuked the executive
in the treaty context where the executive proposed to delegate to
itself.149 Treaties and statutes can and do give power to executivebranch officers in certain circumstances because they are subject
to additional congressional engagement or judicial review.150 But
executive agreements do not benefit from that arrangement and
cannot be treated as if they do, according to the incapacity model.
Viewing executive agreements as interchangeable with treaties
or statutes raises concerns under the Supremacy Clause, which
recognizes the Constitution, laws, and treaties as the “supreme
law of the land.”151
For the same reason, the incapacity framework rejects the internationalists’ argument that executive-agreement commitments could have the force of law domestically on the basis that
their self-executing status claims are stronger than the case for

148 It would give it the force of the law of the land. See SLOSS, supra note 30, at 107–
28 (discussing the widely accepted doctrinal rules).
149 See, e.g., Galbraith, supra note 23, at 1357 (providing an example).
150 See Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. 211, 225 (1872) (describing the further review).
151 U.S. CONST. art. V, cl. 2. The interchangeability thesis is well-known. See, e.g.,
Clark, supra note 26, at 1598 (explaining the constitutional hierarchy); Galbraith, supra
note 23, at 1350 (same); Ackerman & Golove, supra note 88, at 829 (same).

1698

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:7

sole executive agreements.152 Unless an executive agreement is
considered a “treaty” or a “law,” the Supremacy Clause does not
permit it to override federal law. Under this view, the Constitution provides political safeguards over agency activity but denies
any one federal actor the power to make federal law alone.153
The incapacity framework rebuffs the insinuation made by
domestic-administration proponents that Congress is treating the
executive as its agent, with wide discretion. According to the incapacity view, it takes an extreme reading of these delegations to
see them as allowing the agency to change law without more.
Most of the executive agreements studied here would falter on a
constitutional basis if implemented by the executive under some
claim of inherent authority.154 Any conclusion to the contrary
would diverge from the way Congress operates in the foreign-commercial context as well as in other areas of law where it does provide such guidance.155
The incapacity framework also contests the view that
Congress has acquiesced to improvised implementation and accepted the executive’s wide interpretation of the negotiating delegations. Scholars have effectively shown that Congress does not
know the extent of the executive’s agreement activity.156 In the
eyes of the incapacity advocate, concerns about transparency issues temper any claim that Congress approves of the executive’s
implementation, just as the dates of these delegations do. Most of
Congress’s delegations to the executive branch that invite the
branch to negotiate agreements originated in the second half of
the twentieth century.157 They coincide with the development of

152 As noted above, sole executive agreements made pursuant to the president’s inherent authority may be self-executing. Pink, 315 U.S. at 229; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330.
153 Clark, supra note 26, at 1604.
154 It is not the purpose of this Article to scrutinize the delegations surrounding individual implementation actions or their underlying agreements. Still, it is noteworthy that,
where known, the statutes on which agencies purport to rely for implementation often
diverge from their negotiating authority as stated in the congressional delegation. With
respect to the St. Lawrence Seaway agreement and implementation noted above, the
State Department refers to 33 U.S.C. § 988(a) as authorization for the agreement. The
Department of Transportation likewise relies on that delegation for its rulemaking. See
33 U.S.C. §§ 983(a), 984(a)(4), 988; see also, e.g., Tariff of Tolls, 86 Fed. Reg. 15,585. But
in the case of the distilled-spirits agreements, the USTR has relied on its organic act where
the Treasury necessarily cites 27 U.S.C. § 205(e).
155 See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (describing in detail the policy tools available to the
executive when certain foreign commercial and national security conditions are met).
156 See, e.g., Hathaway et al., supra note 9, at 694–97.
157 Nearly all of the more than forty delegations studied for this project date to this
period.
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the Case-Zablocki Act,158 a transparency regime created at a time
when there were many fewer executive agreements. There has
been an unanticipated explosion of international legal development in the intervening years. Some of these delegations also preceded the end of the legislative veto, which could have provided
additional congressional involvement and checks on the execution
of these delegations.159
The constitutional-incapacity model is especially concerned
with instances where an agency uses an executive agreement to
carry out work that it could not have done without an executive
agreement. This is not conjecture: some agencies have used executive agreements to achieve both goals not clearly in their purview and outcomes that they could not have reached through regulation. For instance, an agreement with Mexico regarding steel
and aluminum negotiated in 2019 by its terms appears to give the
U.S. president more authority than was available under the delegating statute.160 Similarly, some executive agreements rely on
other executive agreements for their constitutional authority.161
In such instances, agencies bootstrap multiple agreements from
one congressional delegation. Staff have noted that some agencies
will intentionally choose to negotiate agreements in areas where
congressional approval is not needed and build on them progressively over time.162
This model raises alarm as to how the executive may be coopting the legislative role by deciding, without direction from
Congress, the strength of any executive-agreement commitment.
Further, the executive can use that authority to take additional
regulatory action and displace statutes. This sort of behavior is

158

Pub. L. No. 92-403, 86 Stat. 619 (1972) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 112b).
Many predate Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
(1983), in which the Court declared legislative vetoes to be unconstitutional, and they
originally included legislative-veto provisions. Such provisions would have required the
executive branch to send the agreement to Congress prior to its entry into force. PostChadha, Congress tended to leave the delegations without taking further steps or installing greater oversight. Presidential Power, supra note 9, at 201.
160 See Joint Statement by the United States and Mexico on Section 232 Duties on
Steel and Aluminum, U.S.-Mex., https://perma.cc/UUB5-ED4J (providing license to either
party to impose duties on steel and aluminum products coming from the other party). Although the agreement provides for this arrangement between the two countries, the president is likely not authorized under U.S. law to impose such tariffs. See, e.g., Simon Lester
(@snlester), TWITTER (June 23, 2020), https://perma.cc/WLB6-L4VE.
161 See USTR Statement on Successful Conclusion of Steel Negotiations with Mexico,
OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP. (Nov. 5, 2020), https://perma.cc/DN2M-5Z82 (relying entirely
on an earlier agreement as a legal foundation for additional rulemaking).
162 Interview with USTR Official via Zoom (Nov. 4, 2020) (on file with author).
159
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not conventional executive overreach.163 Rather, executive agreements provide an additional means for regulators, businesses,
and foreign governments not just to influence or execute but also
to box out legislative authorities.164 The executive has used its
limited delegation authority to control the narrative as well as the
future direction of the law, pushing Congress (and sometimes
agencies) farther back from foreign relations decision-making.
The incapacity framework finds all these implied delegations
to be insufficient to support agency work, which it considers ultra
vires and illegitimate. By this view, in contrast to the positions of
the other two frameworks, neither the agreements themselves
nor the subsequent agency implementation actions have the force
of law. It maintains that agencies are empowered only to negotiate agreements, and like the treaty formalists might conclude,
implementation ought to be left to Congress.
***
Viewing executive-agreement implementation according to
these preexisting boxes and categories, none of which is fully representative of the agreement experience, is imperfect. Each of
these frameworks seeks to rationalize and explain agency practice based on prevailing ideas designed for other areas of law. In
both our scholarly and doctrinal dialogues about statutes and
treaties, as well as in our constitutional separation of powers debates, executive agreements are either absent or viewed as exceptions to mainstream activities. That oversight is a result of disciplinary pathologies that are premised on erroneous notions about
the roles of the executive and the legislature in transnational regulation. None of these approaches proves reliable for analyzing
the enforceability and implementation of agreements.
Perhaps most importantly, the pliability of these approaches
permits agencies and their advocates to try to have it both ways:
they can claim foreign relations exceptionalism when convenient
to achieve agency aims without scrutiny, and they can claim domestic administrative privilege when it suits them to shield

163 See generally OREN GROSS & FIONNUALA NÍ AOLÁIN, LAW IN TIMES OF CRISIS:
EMERGENCY POWERS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2006).
164 In basketball, a player wishing to protect her place under the basket, in seeking
to recover a rebound from a failed shot, “boxes out” her opponent. She lines up in front of
her opponent and then pushes back so that she occupies the closer spot to the basket and
her opponent cannot reach the ball—no matter who took the original shot or whose side of
the court the players are on.
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themselves from congressional oversight or other forms of interference.
The developments surrounding implementation of executive
agreements are not just relevant to the statute and treaty duopoly
in the implementation literature; rather, those debates have an
additional set of applications with different stakes and features.
The divergent outcomes among these approaches suggest that
some reconciliation may be needed. That reconciliation could take
place after the fact, acknowledging that improvised implementation in its present incarnation is here to stay, or it could mean
revisiting the present practices and considering structural reforms on the front end. The next Part charts a way forward.
IV. RECONCILIATIONS AND REFORM
This Part considers institutional responses to the normative
appraisal carried out above. The best response, I contend, is not
prioritizing one of the three positive frameworks. Rather, agreement implementation is better managed through changes to the
design of statutory programs that give rise to the agreements. I
begin from the premise that implementation is largely in
Congress’s hands. Congress can alleviate the need for guesswork
in implementation while preserving some executive autonomy. I
recommend a way forward that I call “prescriptive implementation.” Prescriptive implementation better accounts for the pitfalls
and the profits of the present approach. This Part then turns to
lessons and implications. The entire agreement-implementation
process has takeaways for the intersection of foreign relations
and separation of powers, as well as for administrative law.
A. Finding a Practical Way Forward
We return to the critical normative question of how these
types of obligations ought to be implemented. Executive agreement implementation does not have to promote some rule of law
values at the expense of others. Much of the uncertainty can be
alleviated, and therefore many of these problems addressed, if
Congress could take a slightly heavier hand and write more into
the original delegation. Revising the present approaches to address these democratic deficits would go a long way to creating a
stable and legitimate regulatory landscape. There is a way both
to appease separation of powers formalists and to maintain the
functional benefits of executive-agreement implementation.
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I offer an alternative to assuage some of the uncertainty. Although it requires some statutory heavy lifting, prescriptive implementation is already a feature of some delegations, and there
is room for more. Congress just needs to provide moderately more
direction. This approach would sustain some degree of flexibility
while also resolving unknowns both for the public and for the bureaucrats who face the difficulty of making these legal and institutional decisions on the fly.
1. Prescriptive implementation.
As noted from the outset of this study, the legal community
tends to look at the relationship between Congress and the executive regarding agreements in terms of the presence or absence
of a delegation.165 Yet, rarely do we scrutinize whether Congress
is writing enough into its delegations.166 Rather, scholars have
tried to resolve the question largely by dissolving it. Prior works
have dismissed the question of whether Congress needs to write
in more based on two rationales: first, by contending that some
executive agreements are not changing U.S. law and are therefore
inconsequential, and second, by observing that there is a regulatory process with checks and balances built in for executivebranch activity that applies likewise to agreement implementation.167 As the examples above indicate, those explanations are
overly limited. First, many executive agreements do make or force
changes to U.S. law in some way. The perceptions among some
lawmakers that these agreements are just clarifying devices that
do not contain obligations or carry legal weight have been shown

165 See, e.g., Hathaway et al., supra note 9, at 634, 682; Presidential Power, supra
note 9, at 145.
166 Such oversight is sometimes assumed. See, e.g., Young, supra note 2, at 130. (“Delegations to agencies have been accepted in our legal culture primarily because both the
courts and Congress retain significant control over the exercise of delegated authority.”);
Treaties’ End, supra note 3, at 1321 (“The legislation creating [congressional-executive
agreements] can include any necessary implementing language . . . the same act that provides the authority to accede to the international agreement can also make the necessary
statutory changes to implement the obligation incurred.”).
167 Others have noted that most delegations do not include the power to make or interpret law that is binding within the U.S. legal system. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM 1–31 (2d ed. 2015). Professor Galbraith
adds another consideration: preexisting domestic authority. She argues that “to ensure
that the United States can implement an international commitment, the executive branch
will generally need . . . [presidential authority or congressional legislation].” Jean
Galbraith, From Treaties to International Commitments: The Changing Landscape of Foreign Relations Law, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1675, 1707 (2017).
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to be problematic.168 It is simply a matter of fact that agreements
frequently create new commitments; they are not just part of or
amendments to other instruments.169
Second, and more importantly for this study, while some executive agreements may not themselves purport to change the
law, they are being operationalized in ways that do. Through formal and informal agency actions, executive agreements become
embedded in U.S. law. Thus, it is insufficient to conclude that a
particular agreement does not conflict with U.S. law so as to require a change. That executive agreement creates a binding commitment on the United States that may require maintaining
course, may require a new course of action, and may change the
course of executive-branch activity. Further, that agreement may
entrench certain practices that precipitate still additional lawmaking. Often, more directly, that agreement may mean the
agency develops an instrument with direct effect on private parties. And, as we have seen, that agreement is not subject to regulatory or judicial oversight in the way that domestic agency work
is.
Our current thinking is overly constrained by debates in foreign relations law that have adhered to questions of text and
structure, as well as by the administrative law debates on process, checks, and balances. Even though the legal vehicles that
agencies use to drive implementation are parallel to run-of-themill domestic-policymaking processes governed by administrative
law, the foreign element tends to bring discussions back to separation of powers concerns, crowding out more creative solutions.
What is needed here is empowerment through circumscribed direction, not greater domestication, internationalization, or constitutional brakes.
One way forward could be for Congress to articulate how
agencies should go about implementation in its original delegation. Congress exercises control over the bureaucracy through

168 See IAN FERGUSSON & CHRISTOPHER DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43491, TRADE
PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA): FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 15 (2019); see also
Lighthizer Testimony 2020, supra note 86 (question from Senator Chuck Grassley concerning integrating geographical indicators into the agreement with the United Kingdom
rather than putting them in a side letter).
169 See, e.g., Exchange of Letters, Pan.-U.S., June 28, 2007 (concerning domestic suppliers) (on file with author); Exchange of Letters, Kor.-U.S., June 30, 2007 (concerning
copyright and distribution of works) (on file with author); Exchange of Letters, Bahr.-U.S.,
Sept. 14, 2004 (concerning gambling regulations) (on file with author).
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agency design, including in foreign relations.170 Improvised implementation calls into question the reliability and sufficiency of
those initial structural bargains. Instead, Congress could build in
parameters as to implementation in its delegations to negotiate.
Prescriptive implementation involves an explicit allocation of congressional authority to the agency for implementation. It could go
further still by setting up the establishment of appropriate procedures or bureaucratic structures to support effective implementation.
This move would provide guidance to executive-branch officials who sometimes struggle with the operationalization of
various commitments, and it would resolve outstanding legal
questions about the separation of powers. It would alleviate the
need for a guessing game between and within the
domestic-administration or internationalist frames, and it would
resolve the preoccupations of the incapacity advocates.171
Congress could establish in advance of negotiation any parameters needed to address the agreement’s ultimate force of law and
enforceability. And it need not be one-size-fits-all. Congress could
choose to give the executive discretion in that process as Congress
sees fit. For example, Congress might choose to give the executive
increased discretion to adopt the implementation method in areas
that require more expertise or flexibility and responsiveness. In
areas more likely to be compromised by capture, Congress could
direct the executive to undertake a variety of public engagements,
and in areas of broad public concern, it could direct agencies to
seek more input through rulemaking processes.
The implementation mechanism may likewise depend on the
breadth of the substantive delegation—how much license the executive has on the content of the agreement, for instance. Prescriptive implementation preserves greater bicameralism by
shifting the preliminary decision-making to Congress to determine what type of rule it wishes the executive to pursue.172 It also
allows Congress to let agencies choose where it believes they are
ultimately well positioned to manage these legal questions, mediating among the institutional competencies of the branches.
170

See Ingber, supra note 126, at 412–37.
It would likewise eliminate reliance on any preexisting domestic authority or the
president’s inherent authority. See, e.g., Galbraith, supra note 167, at 1708–09.
172 Professor John McGinnis has made similar arguments in the context of clear statements of self-execution. See John O. McGinnis, Medellín and the Future of International
Delegation, 118 YALE L.J. 1712, 1715 (2009) (calling for heightened standards for selfexecution “to assure that legislative consent to the delegation is actual, deliberative, and
transparent”).
171
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Providing implementation guidance to agencies would put the foreign relations bureaucracy on stronger footing in its management
of transnational regulation.
On rare occasions, Congress has provided such a path for implementation, directing the president or the agency as to how
to convert agreement commitments to domestic law. Take
§ 103(a) of the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and
Accountability Act of 2015.173 This section permits the president
to enter into trade agreements with foreign countries “[w]henever
the President determines that one or more existing duties or other
import restrictions on any foreign country or the United States
are unduly burdening and restricting the foreign trade of the
United States.”174 Upon entering into such agreements, the president may proclaim corresponding changes to U.S. tariff rates.175
More than two dozen agreements have entered into force under
these terms.176 In these instances, Congress prescribed authorization (tariff-modification delegation), method (agreement), and
mode of implementation (presidential proclamation). In the few
test cases of such provisions in the early part of the twentieth
century, courts widely permitted prescriptive implementation.177
Such prescriptions are uncommon. I examined more than
forty different delegations from Congress to the executive to negotiate or conclude an international agreement, and in only three
did Congress indicate how the executive branch ought to change
or make U.S. law on the basis of its agreement or provide for any

173

19 U.S.C. 4201 § 103(a).
§ 103(a).
175 § 103(a).
176 I was able to identify only three such agreements from 1995 to 2019, although the
2019 trade agreement with Japan was justified to Congress as a § 103(a) agreement. See
CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY & BRANDON J. MURRILL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11400,
PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO ADDRESS TARIFF BARRIERS IN TRADE AGREEMENTS UNDER
SECTION 103(A) (2020); BROCK R. WILLIAMS, CATHLEEN D. CIMINO-ISAACS & ANITA REGMI,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46140, “STAGE ONE” U.S.-JAPAN TRADE AGREEMENTS 18 (2019).
Whether that agreement satisfies the statutory criteria is a matter of debate. See Ways &
Means Members Press USTR for Answers on U.S.-Japan Trade Agreement in Letter to
Lighthizer, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Nov. 27, 2019. The low number of agreements after 1995
can be explained by the creation of the World Trade Organization and the development of
major congressional-executive free trade agreements as the primary instrument of trade
policy.
177 See, e.g., La Manna, Azema & Farnan v. United States, 144 F. 683 (2d Cir. 1906)
(per curiam) (concluding that an agreement with France, implemented into U.S. law by
proclamation as called for by the statute, was valid); Mihalovitch, Fletcher & Co. v. United
States, 160 F. 988, 988 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1908) (same).
174
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further congressional direction or supervision.178 Clearer pathways such as these, even if diverse, would alleviate some of the
legally risky improvisation by the executive branch that this
study highlights.
Supplying implementation guidance would also help protect
against executive underreach, which is a problem in other areas
of administrative law.179 Where an agency fulfills a statutory
mandate to negotiate an agreement but then refuses to act on it,
including language regarding implementation can ensure that
the legislative purpose is fully realized. Implementation then
completes the work through which agencies lay out the requirements of a statute.180
Prescriptive implementation likewise complements efforts to
enhance transparency in executive agreements. With further
guidance from Congress as to implementation, more of what the
agency develops is likely to become a matter of public record—not
only because Congress could require that but also in the course of
the ordinary procedural activities that Congress is likely to prescribe. Directing agencies to use administrative law mechanisms
in the implementation phase advances prior arguments calling
for the application of the APA in the agreement context.181 Even
where agencies rebuff efforts to require the APA in the making of
agreements, lawmakers may find greater receptivity in applying
the APA to implementation once an agreement has been negotiated.
This alternative mechanism is one way to direct the
thinking for legal architects seeking to maximize the domesticadministration proponent’s commitments to expertise, efficiency,
and flexibility while embracing the internationalist’s prioritization of an outside actor calling some of the shots. It avoids the
178 I selected these statutory provisions based on the delegations cited by the executive branch in its reports to Congress on executive agreements. These are available in the
Case Act memoranda provided to Congress, many of which have been collected by way of
a Freedom of Information Act request conducted by Professors Oona A. Hathaway, Curtis
A. Bradley, and Jack L. Goldsmith. See Hathaway et al., supra note 9, at 635. As
Professors Hathaway, Bradley, and Goldsmith’s data reveal, the executive relies on only
a few dozen statutes as the foundation for its executive-agreement negotiations, and few
of them include any clear delegation to negotiate an agreement at all. Id. at 683–84. My
team also considered delegations surrounding the primary negotiating delegation to ensure that further instruction was not located elsewhere in the same chapter of the U.S.
Code.
179 I use the term “executive underreach” here to refer to occasions when Congress
delegates and the executive does not act. Cf. David Pozen & Kim L. Scheppele, Executive
Underreach, in Pandemics and Otherwise, 114 AM. J. INT’L L. 608 (2020).
180 See Stack, supra note 125, at 876.
181 See Presidential Power, supra note 9, at 241–59.
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more drastic interventions, such as sending agreements back to
Congress for implementation, while also sidestepping wholesale
judicial review. It rejects the internationalist’s blurring of the line
between treaty and agreement. And, it clearly delineates responsibility between Congress and administrative agencies in a way
that ameliorates the concerns of the incapacity framework
through its explicit delegation of authority.
At present, there is no clear correlation between how independent an agency is and how it implements these sorts of agreements. Prescriptive implementation would serve as a loose-fitting
managerial device and would take account of those important distinctions. Prescriptive implementation credits agency implementation choices within a congressionally directed foreign relations
administrative state.
Accordingly, prescriptive implementation could have benefits
for all three branches. The more tailored response that prescriptive implementation would provide could create a balance that
would avoid overly restrictive congressional intervention while
also giving the executive a clear path to move from international
to U.S. law. It would mean providing the mechanism that the executive ought to use without telling the executive what the resulting content ought to entail: a specification of means as compared
to a specification of rules. Some executive-branch lawyers have
suggested that further implementation-oriented guidance would
simplify and streamline their work, relieving some of the legal
speculation of improvised implementation.182 This customized approach would also create legal safeguards against congressional
interference in the outcome of negotiations by setting the guidance prospectively without regard to the content of the agreement. Prescriptive implementation recognizes the agency’s lawmaking power in administrative governance and the limitations
of existing delegations. It seeks to ensure that at least one other
branch can play a supervisory role in securing the rule of law in
that domain.
2. Discontents and their alternatives.
Prescriptive implementation is not the only way to alleviate
some of the concerns about improvised implementation. It has its
limitations, especially where Congress is unable to make such
moves, where it is ill-prepared to do so, or where doing so would
182 Telephone Interview with Former Government Officials (July 7, 2021) (on file with
author).
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exacerbate process concerns. Still, it holds more promise than the
alternatives. For example, another institutional solution could be
to rely upon centralized instruction from the White House as to
the organization and conversion of international commitments.
Top-down guidance from within the executive branch could better
address competing or complimentary legislative authorities and
seek to reconcile their areas of overlap. The limited political valence of some of these authorities could create space for a lasting
White House–led organization and workplan. But such an approach would require extensive legal support to be effective and
comprehensive, which makes it both less attractive and less likely
to be adopted.
Another option would be for the State Department, as primary keeper of international agreements on the part of the U.S.
government, to create requirements for other agencies that would
help manage implementation processes and streamline them
based on a legal analysis rather than through improvised methods. The State Department maintains a similar process called the
Circular-175 process (C-175) for agreement negotiations.183 Under
that regime, agencies wishing to enter into an agreement with a
foreign partner must engage with the State Department and its
lawyers regarding the authority for such a negotiation and the
drafting that follows.184 Adopting a C-175 process for implementation could create some consistency and reliability across the
foreign-facing administrative state. It would create additional responsibilities for the State Department that would likely require
financial resources, however. The State Department has shown
in other contexts that it may not be best suited for such a role—
and that playing such a role has the potential to strengthen interagency discord.185 A compromise option could be for Congress
to require that agencies also outline their implementation plans
and authorities when they report their agreements to the State
Department for its reporting to Congress;186 such a step would at
least create some transparency and opportunity for tracking
where there is none at present.
183 1 U.S.C. § 112b(c); U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 720,
https://perma.cc/7296-VEAT (2006).
184 See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SUPPLEMENTAL HANDBOOK ON THE C-175 PROCESS:
ROUTINE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENTS, https://perma.cc/DPE3-5QYA; 22
C.F.R. § 181.4.
185 See, e.g., Kathleen Claussen, Trade Administration, 107 VA. L. REV. 845, 871
(2021). See generally Hathaway et. al, supra note 9 (discussing areas where the State
Department has fallen short on agreement reporting and publishing).
186 See supra text accompanying notes 157–159 (discussing the Case-Zablocki Act).
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Still another option would be to have the Administrative
Conference of the United States (ACUS), an independent federal
agency within the executive branch charged with recommending
improvements to administrative process and procedure, lead a
process of information gathering and analysis that would then
lead to guidelines for agencies on how to carry out agreement implementation. Although ACUS does not typically work in the foreign relations space, moving it in that direction would help bridge
the divides discussed in this Article. The final output—a recommendation and a report of best practices—would not be binding
on any agency, but it could lead to some informal harmonization
among agency approaches.
Agreement implementation could also be an opportunity for
hybrid lawmaking through which federal agencies solicit views
from the public or other agencies before entering into commitments, similar to the way public comment is sought on trade
agreements.187 Both Congress and the executive could develop
more elaborate consultation requirements and public hearings to
receive and incorporate views throughout the implementation
process, essentially clarifying and fortifying procedural implementation mechanisms prospectively.
Agencies could unroll their own alternative strategies for implementation much as has occurred to integrate private standards into regulatory work.188 Agency reliance on private standards
exhibits many of the same transparency issues and even graver
access problems than do executive agreements.189 Some of the issues in the private standards context were alleviated by the Office
of the Federal Register’s rule requiring agencies attempting to incorporate private standards by reference to add more information
about those standards to their rules, including full summaries
and the steps taken to make the relevant materials “reasonably
available.”190 Even a simple requirement of asking agencies to
publish their agreements along with the implementation or treat-

187

See Fergusson & Davis, supra note 168, at 3.
I thank Professor Gabriel Scheffler for this point.
189 At earlier points in history, owners of such standards charged exorbitant fees for
access to private standards that agencies had imposed. See, e.g., Daniel Farber & Anne
Joseph O’Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1375, 1424 (2017) (providing examples). See generally Nina A. Mendelson, Private Control Over Access to Public
Law: The Perplexing Federal Regulatory Use of Private Standards, 112 MICH. L. REV. 737
(2014); Peter L. Strauss, Private Standards Organizations and Public Law, 22 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 497 (2013).
190 Incorporation by Reference, 79 Fed. Reg. 66,267 (Nov. 7, 2014).
188
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ment of those agreements, much like has been proposed to increase accountability as to the making of executive agreements,191
could be democratically meaningful and enhance congressional
awareness as well as public awareness as to just what tools agencies are using for this purpose.
Finally, a question remains as to whether the courts can do
the necessary sorting on these critical questions of the enforceability of the resulting domestic or international commitments as
created by agencies. To date, courts have either shied away from
the question or focused on matters of delegatory sufficiency. Several legal canons, such as ripeness and justiciability, make these
cases unattractive if not prohibitive.192 Foreign relations exceptionalism in administrative law allows courts to punt in the face
of an APA challenge, for instance.193 The invisibility of these
agreements, their often-limited product or service markets, and
the option of agency-level solutions have limited interest in judicial resolution. Courts are handicapped by these limitations and
underequipped to do the necessary sorting. Instead, private sector
actors are lobbying agencies privately to undertake various implementation mechanisms.194
In fact, where clarification is most needed is less with respect
to demarcating the fringes of statutory delegations as courts have
tended to do but more with respect to agreement facilitation. That
is not to diminish the importance of questions of delegation, but
given the present landscape, its far reach, and the practical difficulties of unwinding it, the weightiest legal issues to be sorted out
as they relate to executive agreements are far more about their
performance than their promise. The reality is that courts may
not be the best suited to do that work, but they may be faced nevertheless with some of executive agreements’ practical manifestations before too long.

191 See, e.g., Hathaway et. al., supra note 9, at 697–709 (recommending legislative
reform to the State Department’s system for agreement transparency); Kathleen
Claussen, Trade Transparency: A Call for Surfacing Unseen Deals, 122 COLUM L. REV. F.
1, 7–9 (recommending a stronger regime for agreement publication).
192 See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984) (referring to the “classical deference to the political branches in matters of foreign policy”).
193 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1); see also Sitaraman, supra note 23 (elaborating and cabining
the exception).
194 Email from Former Department of Commerce Official to Kathleen Claussen, Prof.,
Univ. of Miami Sch. of L. (July 15, 2021) (on file with author).
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B. A New Disciplinary and Doctrinal Frontier
Agency implementation of international commitments poses
a new frontier for both foreign relations and administrative law
scholars.195 Its features fit uncomfortably into existing frameworks, which is why a new mechanism and a corresponding
framework that follows congressional prescription is needed. Just
as the domestic administrative and regulatory landscape looks
different than it did when our traditional administrative law tools
were crafted,196 demanding fresh thinking, those differences are
compounded when it comes to executive agreements. There are
far more agreements than when the conventional models developed; those agreements are increasingly unmoored from clear delegations of authority and less transparent. Most importantly, and
likely unexpected by drafters, they are directly applied by agencies to meet the political and regulatory challenges of the globalized economy. The structures traditionally associated with foreign agreements remain a publication and reporting chain of
command that does not work, rather than instruments or institutions that we associate with domestic rulemaking.197
Given what this research has laid bare as to agency behavior
and how agreement implementation provides a powerful counterparadigm to our mainstream understandings, multiple lessons
surface for those priors and for the fields across which this work
occurs.
First is a recognition of the significant areas of practice where
foreign relations and administrative law ideas coincide. One
would expect the difficulty in the epistemological landscape to be
one of overlap, rather than oversight, but that has not been the
case. Their complementary features lend themselves to more
scholarly cross-pollination than has occurred. Executive agreements are underappreciated as key instruments in the domestic
and international regulatory project. It is not just that foreign relations law covers substance and administrative law covers procedure. More directly, executive-agreement implementation is a
product of both subfields, and this recognition reveals the need
for a theoretical reconceptualization of existing silos. One difficulty in doing so is that both literatures bring baggage. The fields
195 Still another frontier not taken up here are foreign compacts at the state level
concerning transboundary roads, bridges, and waterways. There is more work to be done
on whether states are implementing those in ways consistent with the intent of their legislatures, for example.
196 See Gluck et al., supra note 94, at 1792.
197 See Hathaway et. al., supra note 9, at 633.
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have shared values but different institutional and intellectual
pedigrees that inform them.
Few see foreign relations law as belonging to or working with
administrative law.198 This Article joins other recent studies that
suggest that foreign relations scholars ought to confront additional questions of administrative law.199 It seeks to shift the focus
of the central question of foreign relations law (how and to what
extent do international commitments become part of U.S. law)200
from courts, constitutional law, and treaties to agencies, administrative law, and executive agreements.
Further, in foreign relations, the mainstream works thoroughly review the separation of powers issues in the making and
authorization of executive agreements,201 while a second strain of
scholarship covers the separation of powers in exiting agreements.202 Both the entrance and the exit are well covered. But almost no work has been done on the in-between. This is a perplexing shortcoming of foreign relations law: there is widespread
acceptance of executive agreements as the primary tool of U.S.
international lawmaking, but the available analytical work on
them only looks at how they are created or destroyed.203
Similarly, our intellectual inheritance in foreign relations
law also carries with it a long-standing and well-entrenched distinction between monism and dualism, two different schools of
thought on the relationship between international and domestic
law. Monism posits that there is no distinction between the two.
As Professor John Coyle explains, “[t]he monist view is simply
that international law and domestic law are part of the same legal
198 Professors Ganesh Sitaraman and Ingrid Wuerth make the point that foreign relations law flirts with administrative law but never fully embraces it. See Sitaraman &
Wuerth, supra note 124, at 1949–51.
199 See Sitaraman, supra note 23, at 492 (noting that they “raise precisely the same
set of competing constitutional and functional values”); Willliam S. Dodge, Chevron Deference and Extraterritorial Regulation, 95 N.C. L. REV. 911 (2017) (discussing the intersection between presumptions against exterritoriality and the steps of Chevron).
200 See BRADLEY, supra note 43, at 1–31 (defining foreign relations law as the domestic law of each nation that governs how that nation interacts with the rest of the world).
201 See Presidential Power, supra note 9, at 145 (discussing the separation of powers
in the making, or “power to conclude”).
202 See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn & Rebecca J. Hamilton, Exit from International Tribunals, 2018 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 1. See also generally Harold Hongju Koh, Presidential Power to Terminate International Agreements, 118 YALE L.J.F. 432 (2018); Laurence
R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2005).
203 Some scholars have discussed when they can be deployed. See, e.g., Bodansky &
Spiro, supra note 9, at 927 (“[A] key feature of [executive agreements plus] is that they
must not only be consistent with, and capable of implementation on the basis of existing
law, but also be complementary to existing law by addressing the transnational aspects of
a problem.”).
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system and that domestic courts may, whenever necessary, draw
upon international law as a rule of decision.”204 Dualism posits
that international law and domestic law exist in two separate
spheres and that the relationship between the two spheres is mediated by domestic actors. Coyle writes, “[i]n a dualist system, domestic actors may choose to incorporate elements of international
law into domestic law, but they are likewise free to reject those
elements if they so choose.”205 The majority view among U.S. foreign relations scholars has been that the U.S. system is primarily
dualist though the lines are not entirely solid between the
camps.206 This traditional understanding can be seen in the treaty
debates. Under a dualist analysis, apart from self-executing treaties that automatically become part of U.S. law, all other international instruments require some further step to be considered
U.S. law and to be eligible for enforcement in U.S. courts.
This review of improvised implementation by agencies shows
that there is far more happening on the monist side than was previously understood or appreciated. The prevalence of automatic
implementation is not just an instantiation of creeping monism
but rather may be reflective of dualism’s gradual dissipation.207
Our improvised implementation mechanisms move the needle of
U.S. experience closer to monism than prior encounters have
suggested.
Likewise, our typical administrative law accounts do not
readily consider agreements as ordinary instruments in the administrative orchestra. Indeed, they specifically exclude foreign

204

See Incorporative Statutes, supra note 30, at 434 n.1.
Id.
206 Compare Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 531 (1999) (“Notwithstanding academic claims
to the contrary, the U.S. approach to international law has been and continues to be fundamentally dualist.”), and John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law be
Part of Our Law?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1175, 1180 (2007) (“[S]trict dualism is particularly
suitable for the legal regime of a modern democratic superpower.”), with Jackson, supra
note 31, at 320 (suggesting that the United States is a hybrid monist-dualist system), and
Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2169–71 (1999)
(seeing monism as the framers’ preference). Some scholars have identified nonetheless a
“creeping monism” seen in the way that courts increasingly rely on international law to
inform their decision-making in certain areas of law. See Melissa A. Waters, Creeping
Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 639 (2007) (“Despite its historical hybrid approach to treaty incorporation, by the latter half of the twentieth century the American legal system shared
with its common law counterparts a fairly strict dualist approach to human rights
treaties.”).
207 See Incorporative Statutes, supra note 30, at 434 n.1 (citing Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 185, 231 (1993)).
205
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relations instruments from their purview.208 Thus, one lesson of
this study is that administrative law scholarship may take an
overly limited internal view. If, instead, we think of executive implementation as expanding the scope of the field, we could appreciate how improvised implementation creates opportunities for
agencies to execute legislative mandates in alternative ways—
and ways that might actually enhance administrative law
values.209 Bringing executive agreements more expressly into administrative law discussions may inform the processes for
implementation in ways that further administrative law principles such as by creating more space in negotiation or by limiting
the means of implementation to those democratically driven
processes.
On the other hand, there may be space for rules to be negotiated with foreign partners in a way that preserves agency autonomy and administrative rule of law values while also facilitating
foreign engagement. The ways that agencies reconcile what is effectively a Venn diagram of delegations in foreign relations law is
opportunity enhancing if not opportunity creating.210
The idea that agreements form the foundation for transnational regulatory activity is nothing new,211 but what becomes
clear from this investigation is that agencies treat these agreements more like domestic instruments than like international instruments in their application and implementation mechanisms.
This phenomenon is one that we may have anticipated but had
never confirmed until now. Implementation also brings back into
focus the limits of the APA and its exceptions. That approach reinforces the distinctions between the field that may have been an
accurate depiction in the middle of the twentieth century, but
which today does a disservice to analyses such as these. It is not

208 As discussed above, the APA provides an exception for foreign affairs. See supra
text accompanying note 120.
209 Iowa Leagues of Cities v. EPA, 711 F.3d 844, 873 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Expanding the
footprint of a regulation by imposing new requirements, rather than simply interpreting
the legal norms Congress or the agency itself has previously created, is the hallmark of
legislative rules.”).
210 That Venn diagram has legislative, regulatory, and negotiation pieces to it. The
literature on implementation is overly concerned with the legislative piece to the detriment of the regulatory, but all three of these could work together at the center.
211 See, e.g., Cogan, supra note 6, at 344–45. See also generally Elizabeth Trujillo,
Regulatory Cooperation in International Trade and Its Transformative Effects on Executive Power, 25 IND. J. GLOB. L. STUD. 365 (2018); David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard
and Soft, in International Administration, 5 CHI J. INT’L L. 547 (2005); Pierre-Hugues
Verdier, Transnational Regulatory Networks and Their Limits, 34 YALE J. INT’L L.
113 (2009).
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simply that there is convergence between the fields that might
overtake the exception. Rather, foreign relations administration
requires more.
This engagement with agency implementation revisits longstanding debates about legislative versus interpretive rules on
the part of agencies and places them once more in stark relief.212
Whatever the form, agreements are not only rule-like; they are
rules, just in different than usual clothes. Seeing them this way
helps us determine to what extent the executive branch is bound
by or should accept the “constraints of procedural regularity.”213
Historically, those queries were often driven by administrative
law’s guiding principles of accountability and public participation. Although participation values are often treated as less important in foreign relations, that may not be true when foreign
relations come home, as here.
Through its implementation of these agreements, the executive reconfigures administration from within. That the executive
can box out Congress on these areas within congressional control
disrupts our dominant models of shared authority between the
branches. Prescriptive implementation delivers an opportunity to
take advantage of the ad hoc work underway, channel it, and
build upon it. Rather than think of these mechanisms as circumventing legislative silence or overexerting bureaucratic control,
we might see pieces worth fostering, even if rough around the
edges.
Finally, this study bears important lessons not just for the
intersections of administrative law and foreign relations law as
fields of study and work but also for the elasticity of the features
within both. This Article has sought to defeat the duopolies on the
surface of these issues—between the fields and between statutes
and treaties. But it also demonstrates that implementation is
far more nuanced, textured, and complex than just a distinction
between
rulemaking
and
adjudication
or
between
self-executing and non-self-executing instruments. The rise of
executive-agreement implementation teaches us to look beyond
the binary categories on which scholars and practitioners rely
and instead consider questions of agreement enforceability as
falling along a spectrum. Many of these mechanisms land in contested middle ground. Agencies are capitalizing on the middlegrounding effect to be able to operationalize the commitments

212
213

See Merrill & Watts, supra note 35, at 477.
Galbraith, supra note 23, at 1361.
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they have negotiated. The use of these mechanisms in practice
suggests multitiered engagement with delegations, with implementation, and with the agreements themselves. Embracing the
middle ground provides more room for creative thinking on all
aspects of implementation.
Until now, we have barely had a sense of this new frontier,
unaware of what types of obligations the executive has been making or how those obligations might intersect with regulatory
space.214 Seeing agreement implementation and incorporation
along a spectrum that can be facilitated by prescriptive implementation provides a powerful contrast to the dualistic mechanics
that have long befuddled courts and commentators.215 If we discard those analogies in favor of seeing agreement implementation
as somewhat sui generis and judge it on its own merit, deploying
prescriptive implementation as a sorting mechanism, we can
identify other ways in which to understand agency behavior.
In sum, this way of thinking requires rearranging the pieces
of the puzzle in new ways. It means reevaluating the terrain of
the issues, not just relying on familiar formulations or terms that
may get traction with different lawmakers and legal thinkers.
CONCLUSION
Congress as architect regularly shapes and controls the making of international commitments through its delegations to the
executive branch, but it says almost nothing on the flip side of
those negotiations as to the status of such agreements in U.S. law
with respect to either process or legal status. The agencies decide
upon, develop, and deploy their own means by which to transpose
international agreements into U.S. law. And they do so in a way
that is shielded from the judicial review and application that occurs both in the treaty context and in administrative law.
With the lesser reliance on treaties and the great prevalence
of executive agreements operating in a grey zone, these questions
as to how agreements are part of our law form a new frontier for

214 See Galbraith, supra note 23, at 1314 (arguing that “executive branch actors can
have the constitutional authority to act as the intermediary between otherwise unenforceable treaty provisions and the courts through administrative action” and that “the assumption that Congress must implement non-self-executing treaty provisions had become
widespread and remains so, even as the sharp uptick in regulatory treaties in the years
since the end of the Cold War has made this assumption increasingly cumbersome”).
215 See Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties, 102
AM. J. INT’L L. 540, 540 (2008) (noting the befuddlement).
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foreign-facing administration. They are not like other forms of international agreements with either judicial or congressional pronouncements as to their status nor are they entirely akin to statutes and regulations. With the above excavation, we can better
understand how agencies are managing these commitments,
identify how this activity might transform our prior understandings across multiple fields, and envisage a way forward to harness
the potential of executive-agreement implementation.

